

European Influence and Economic Development*

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Abstract

The development accounting literature identifies political institutions as fundamental development determinants. Forms of government or executive constraints shape economic institutions which provide the necessary incentives for economic growth. One strand of the literature suggests that *European influence* affects economic development, presumably through the adoption of European institutions. But how exactly did European influence in the distant past induce positive economic outcomes today? While previous approaches rely on “language,” “settler mortality,” “legal origins,” or the “number of European settlers” as indirect proxies of European influence, we propose a direct and quantifiable mechanism: the adoption of European constitutional features. Constructing a dataset of all constitutional dimensions from 1800-2008, we find that nations experience growth accelerations after adopting features of European constitutions. The growth effects are influenced (negatively) by political turmoil, but they are independent of colonial backgrounds. Legislative rules and provisions curtailing executive power are the key constitutional dimensions that drive development.

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I. Introduction

Growth determinants such as technical change and factor accumulation are thought to respond to economic institutions that influence incentives to invest and innovate.¹ One branch of the recent development accounting literature links economic institutions to the structure and quality of political institutions. Acemoglu and Robinson (2008, p. 283) survey the literature to find that “differential economic development, therefore, is a consequence of differential political development.” This paper further investigates the associated growth effects of political institutions by leveraging the link between *European influence* and political institutional quality that has been previously established in the literature.²

Hall and Jones (1999, p. 100) first suggested that countries with greater European influence develop better institutions because “One of the key features of the 16th through 19th centuries was the expansion of Western European influence around the world.”³ Engerman and Sokoloff (1997), Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002), and Easterly and Levine (2016) provide specific examples of how European influence may have generated political institutions based on countries’ *differential colonization experiences*. Indirect measures of colonial institutions, such as “initial factor endowments,” “settler mortality,” “population density” or “indigenous mortality,” produce compelling empirical evidence but these proxies do not illuminate specific channels through which colonial experiences have shaped particular political and economic institutions over the past 200 years.

North (1990) and La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) provide specific hypotheses of how European influence resulted in differential political institutions based on legal origins. They suggest that the quality of political institutions is a function of the legal system, specifically common law and civil law. Their approach assumes that legal systems were firmly “transplanted” through European conquest and colonization. La Porta et al. then use a *European*

¹ For the various approaches that link development and economic institutions see North (1990), Knack and Keefer (1995), Engerman and Sokoloff (1997), Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002), and Rodrik (2005).

² Other factors, such as geography (e.g., Diamond 1997, Easterly and Levine 2003, and Sachs 2003), ethnic fractionalization/social conflicts (e.g., Mauro 1995, Easterly and Levine 1997, Rodrik 1999a, and Alesina et al. 2003), as well as inequality (e.g., Easterly 2007) have also been linked to development.

³ Hall and Jones use as measures of European influence the fractions of the population speaking English or a Western European language in 1990, respectively. Acemoglu et al. (2001) point to sizable literatures in economics, history, political science, and sociology that suggest European expansion after 1492 had profound impacts on the organization of many societies throughout the world. Glaeser et al. (2004) argue that European influence is synonymous with settler-introduced human-capital-creating institutions.

legal origins dummy (UK common law versus French/German/Scandinavian civil law) to proxy for the quality of countries' political institutions today. In subsequent work, La Porta et al. (2004) propose a more granular approach by suggesting that judicial independence and constitutional review explain the positive effects of common law origins on economic and political freedoms. There is, however, discussion why legal transplantation varied so dramatically across conquests and colonies, and why some countries managed to overcome potentially disadvantageous legal origins when others could not (see Guerriero 2016).

The approaches to identifying European influence on political and economic institutions thus share two stylized facts: (i) European influence is considered to be a crucial determinant of political institutions and economic outcomes, and (ii) *exactly how* European influence translated into different political institutions over the last 200 years remains unspecified and unquantified.⁴ We provide a specific and direct mechanism by which countries' political institutions were affected by European influence. The mechanism is not only simple but also quantifiable: we track the degree to which countries adopted features of European constitutions. Our focus is on *European* constitutional features because they are grounded in Enlightenment principles such as suffrage, separation of powers, justice, civil liberties, and government legitimacy through democratic means. The Enlightenment movement was also the first to outline duties of government such as protection of life, liberty, and property.

To quantify the effects of European influence, we construct a novel dataset that contains detailed information on all constitutions and all revisions/amendments for 183 countries from 1800-2008. By tracking exactly how constitutions changed over the past 200 years relative to European reference constitutions via a similarity index, we find that countries which adopt more (less) European constitutional features experience significant growth accelerations (decelerations). In our benchmark specification, a one standard deviation increase in European influence is associated with a 0.2 to 0.4 percentage point increase in subsequent average annual per capita income growth (depending on the time horizon). These growth accelerations are observable not only in the short run (within 10 years) but can linger for up to 50 years.

⁴ Spolaore and Wacziarg (2013) survey the literature to highlight that the empirical support for theories relying on initial conditions leaves ample room for theories that explain how subsequent changes influenced development. In particular, the share of the variation in income per capita explained by initial conditions rarely surpasses 60% in regressions. For related papers that associate historical initial conditions with current social/civic capital or democracy see, e.g., Persson and Tabellini (2009), Tabellini (2010), Haber (2014), and Guiso et al. (2016).

Our results also highlight that growth accelerations after the adoption of European constitutional features are only observed in politically stable countries. Constitutional changes in times of political turmoil are not robustly associated with growth. Moreover, the growth effects are similar in terms of magnitude and statistical significance for colonies and non-colonies alike. That is, even colonies with unfavorable initial conditions could improve their fortunes through the adoption of European constitutional features over the past 200 years. Importantly, these results suggest that European influence on political and economic institutions was not uniquely determined by events in the distant colonial past; actively “adjusting” European influence is associated with statistically and economically significant effects on development since 1800. This finding contrasts with “book-end” theories of development that focus on initial conditions in the distant past (e.g., initial factor endowments, geography, legal rules transplantation, or conquests) as sole determinants of economic fortunes today.

Our results are in line with Easterly and Levine (2016) who also show that unfavorable initial conditions can be overcome if European settlements existed during colonization. However, Easterly and Levine explicitly emphasize that they cannot identify a potential channel through which initial European influence has shaped long-run economic development; filling this void is the objective of our paper. Our findings contribute to the literature by providing tangible evidence of the link between constitutional change and economic outcomes.⁵ Sweeney (2014) surveys the research on the economic benefits of constitutional change and laments the dearth of clear results, which perhaps is due to the fact that previous empirical analyses were limited by datasets which covered only changes in constitutional amendments (see, e.g., Lutz, 1994 and 1995, Ferejohn, 1997, and Rasch and Congleton, 2006). Our paper correlates all dimensions of constitutions as well as their changes with economic development. We thus provide an entirely novel and comprehensive avenue of assessing the economic impact of constitutional change and European influence on economic outcomes.

There exists a rich prior literature in economics on political institutions and development that focuses on the effects of democratization without clear notions of European influence.⁶ These studies seek to explain growth effects in the most recent wave of democratization post

⁵ For a discussion of the interactions between specific legal rules and economic development see, e.g., Djankov et al. (2003), Feld and Voigt (2003), Hayo and Voigt (2014), and La Porta et al. (1999).

⁶ See, e.g., Acemoglu et al. (forthcoming), Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005), Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008), Persson (2005), Persson and Tabellini (2003, 2006, and 2008), and Rodrik and Wacziarg (2005).

1960. This literature uses dummy indicators derived from the Polity IV database to examine transitions from non-democratic to democratic regimes, or it employs proxies representing forms of government or electoral rules. Hence, their focus is narrower in terms of both the time period and the constitutional dimensions that we consider in this paper. To investigate which particular elements of constitutions are associated with growth accelerations, we do not use a simple democracy indicator but employ instead six distinct dimensions of constitutions that we link to European influence (legislative institutions, electoral rules, executive constraints, judiciary independence, federalism, and human rights). Our results indicate that executive constraints as well as rules covering the legislature and judiciary are most strongly associated with growth accelerations. We do also investigate, however, to what extent constitutional changes may have been associated with differential growth effects in democratic and autocratic countries. Our results suggest that democratic countries experience much stronger growth accelerations after adopting elements of European constitutions.

Empirically, our approach shares the methodological challenges of the previous literature. Good instruments are difficult to justify, particularly for democracy or democratic transitions.⁷ Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) note that panel approaches must rely on restrictive and untestable identifying assumptions in the form of exclusion restrictions. Data problems of the previous literature are compounded in our dataset which spans over 200 years. To examine the robustness of our results, we therefore report a number of different regression specifications which account in various ways for the potential presence of time-invariant country-specific and common time-varying development determinants.

There are important caveats to our approach. First and foremost, *de jure* and *de facto* implementations of constitutional provisions can differ substantially across countries. The issue has been discussed extensively in the development literature's use of the *executive constraint* variable (Polity IV, coded as *de jure*); see, for instance, Acemoglu and Robinson (2006). Given

⁷ For instance, McGuire and Ohsfeldt (1989) explain the voting behavior of the US constitutional convention delegates by their economic backgrounds. In that sense, political institutions could be endogenous with respect to economic forces. Here we do not seek to explain the channels that give rise to constitutional changes as, for instance, in Voigt (1999). Our goal is more modest: we examine if countries experience growth accelerations after they adopt elements of European constitutions. Hayo and Voigt (2013) indicate that political institutions may well be endogenous, but find them to be influenced by political circumstances, not economic outcomes. We make every effort to purge our regressions from endogeneity considerations and omitted variable bias by following well-established first-difference and difference-in-difference approaches; see also Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005).

the lack of comprehensive information on the actual implementation of constitutional rules, we cannot account for *de facto* growth effects. However, if only *de facto* implementation mattered or it annulled a *de jure* effect, then we should find no significant estimates. Our results therefore represent a lower bound of the effect of European influence.

A second caveat relates to the unusually long time dimension and the resulting lack of available control variables. We examine if countries had the ability to adopt European influence to affect their development outcomes over a period of 200 years. Few covariates are available over this long time horizon, and we are therefore limited to apply proper empirical techniques to address the issue. Clearly other influences, such as policy actions or geography can also drive growth (see, e.g., Sachs and Warner, 1997a,b). However, these variables would have to coincide *systematically* with constitutional changes across countries to bias our estimates. Given our long time dimension and broad sample of countries, we are hopeful that there is sufficient variation in the types and timings of these policies to avoid a substantial contamination of our estimates. In an additional robustness check, we also attempt to control for possible omitted variable bias and endogeneity concerns in the post-WWII subsample by using established econometric approaches (see, e.g., Barro 2003 and Durlauf et al. 2008). The results are remarkably similar to our long-run panel; positive European influence through constitutions is a significant growth determinant.

The paper is organized as follows. Section II surveys existing explanations of the impact of constitutional rules on policy outcomes, and discusses the constitution data. Section III lays out our empirical approach, and section IV presents the main results. Section V examines the link between constitutional dimensions and growth. Section VI addresses endogeneity and omitted variable bias concerns in the post-WWII subsample, and section VII concludes.

II. Measuring Political Institutions and European Influence

The previous literature has used a variety of aggregated proxies to measure the quality of political institutions. In their seminal work, Persson and Tabellini (2003) focus on contemporaneous economic outcomes induced by features of political systems, as different forms of government/electoral rules are thought to affect economic institutions in democratic countries. The advantage of this approach is the clear mechanism by which political institutions affect economic outcomes, although Acemoglu (2005) laments that the narrow focus of the Persson and

Tabellini analysis omits the potential effects of other political institutions. Notably absent are executive/judicial constraints and basic human/economic rights that may be correlated with political institutions and economic outcomes. Our European influence measure goes beyond forms of government and electoral rules. By focusing on detailed European constitutional dimensions, we eliminate the guess work as to *how* European influence may have altered economic outcomes. In addition, our approach exploits a rich time series of constitutional changes dating back to 1800 to gauge their effects on development.

II.1 Fundamental Features of European Constitutions

The basic tenets of all European constitutions are the Enlightenment philosophies of Hobbes and Locke (British), Voltaire, Montesquieu, and Rousseau (French), and Kant (German). These philosophers promoted democracy, justice, individual liberty, equality, and an optimistic view of democracy. Montesquieu (1748) explicitly suggested a separation of powers into branches of government. John Locke (1690) outlined the nature of government and the basis of its legitimacy through governing by consent. Locke also described the duties of government, in particular its responsibility to protect the rights of the people, including life, liberty, and property.

These European Enlightenment principles were first written into the US Declaration of Independence, then into the US constitution of 1788, and subsequently adopted by all European constitutions (Berman, 1992). Not only were the authors of the US constitution (as well as the authors of all preceding US state constitutions) European-born or of European descent, they were also steeped in Enlightenment thought. As the first adopter of Enlightenment principles, the US constitution serves as a convenient reference in our empirical analysis below. It provides the longest constitution time series, the fewest constitutional changes, and the US maintained a position at the productivity frontier throughout the sample period. While we choose the US as the reference constitution for our benchmark results, our findings remain largely unchanged when we examine alternative reference constitutions in our robustness section.⁸ To acknowledge the US as our benchmark reference constitution, we use the terms Neo-European and European influence interchangeably from now on.

⁸ We also compiled estimates using France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the UK as reference constitutions. The results are qualitatively similar, although in the cases of the UK, Italy and Spain the growth effects are more constrained to the short run. Relative to the US, the other European reference constitutions suffer, however, from a number of potential drawbacks: (i) shorter time series availability, (ii) frequent and substantial constitutional changes, and/or (iii) the absence of a formal constitution. Detailed results are available on request.

II.2 Quantifying Neo-European Influence

To identify Neo-European influence, we compile a panel dataset of similarity measures between countries’ constitutions and their Neo-European counterparts based on the information provided by the Comparative Constitutions Project (2015). The CCP data contains an exhaustive set of coded constitutional questions that we convert into unambiguous dummy variables.⁹ Overall, our constitution dataset includes 14,147 observations at the country-year level for 183 countries and 200 constitutional rules.¹⁰ This extensive documentation of constitutional provisions allows us to examine the evolution of countries’ political institutions over the past 200 years at an unprecedented level of detail. Table A.1 in the Appendix documents the available constitution time series for each country, and Table A.2 provides an overview of the constitutional rules, their detailed definitions, and summary statistics across all observations.

To identify Neo-European influence, we compute a similarity measure between each constitution and our Neo-European reference constitution at each point in time, t . Since our constitution variables are binary, we generate binary similarity coefficients based on cross-tabulations of country i ’s and reference country j ’s constitutional provisions. Parameter a in Table 1 indicates the number of common constitutional features, while parameters b , c and d count the respective constitutional mismatches due to the absence of a constitutional rule in either country i , country j , or in both countries. To establish a meaningful comparison with the reference constitution, we focus on the vector of constitutional features that is observed in the reference country.¹¹

Table 1: Tabulation of Constitutional Features in Country i and Reference Country j

		obs. j	
		1	0
obs. i	1	a	b
	0	c	d

⁹ For instance, the variable *WARAP* (‘Who has the power to approve declarations of war?’) was originally coded categorically with multiple possible answers. After recoding, it answers the question ‘Does the executive have the power to approve declarations of war?’ The Appendix documents the reasons for recodings for all affected variables.

¹⁰ We exclude variables that are ambiguous or extraneous to our analysis (see Appendix for details). For example, we omit questions such as ‘in what language is the constitution written,’ or ‘who translated the constitution.’ We document for all affected variables the reason for exclusion in the Appendix.

¹¹ We also exclude years in our analysis below that coincide with changes in the reference constitution.

Numerous binary similarity measures have been developed based on the cross-tabulations in Table 1; see Choi et al. (2010) for a survey. Since we are not interested in rough correlations but actual matches between constitutional features, we do not apply correlation-based (Pearson) or distance-based (Euclidian) similarity measures. Instead, we use the most common binary similarity index developed by Hamann (1961), which assigns equal weights to agreements and disagreements in constitutional rules between countries i and j in year t .¹²

$$s_{ij,t} = \frac{(a+d)-(b+c)}{a+b+c+d} . \quad (1)$$

The Hamann similarity coefficient is defined over the interval $[-1,1]$, where higher values indicate greater constitutional similarity.

Figure 1 plots the kernel density of the Hamann similarity coefficients for all countries in our benchmark US sample over different time periods. We observe a distinctly bimodal distribution in the early 1800s, and the mass of dissimilar countries shrinks over time as Neo-European influence rises. Over the entire time period from 1800-2008, the mean/median similarity score is 0.04/0.07 with a standard deviation of 0.31. Figure 2 produces a histogram of the magnitude of all 557 constitutional changes in our sample. Positive values represent shifts towards the reference US constitution. The mean/median is positive (0.07/0.04), but Figure 2 also highlights the existence of ample constitutional events that represent significant shifts away from the US constitution. We will exploit this variation to examine how changes towards (away from) Neo-European constitutions are associated with increases (decreases) in the subsequent GDP per capita growth rates.

We obtain our GDP per capita data from the Maddison Project Database (2013). Missing GDP observations were updated using data from the World Bank's World Development Indicators, Barro and Ursúa (2010), and Bulmer-Thomas (2014).¹³ With the similarity measures and growth data in hand, we obtain a first qualitative impression of the effect of Neo-European influence on development by pooling countries and plotting average growth rates before and after constitutional events. Figure 3 shows the average annual growth rate for countries 20 years

¹² We experimented with several alternative binary similarity coefficients and found very similar results. Rogers and Tanimoto (1960) double the weight on disagreements, and Sneath and Sokal (1962) double weights on agreements. Results for the other measures are available upon request.

¹³ We also impute missing GDP per capita data for individual years. Our results remain robust when omitting these observations.

prior and post constitutional events. Countries with increases (decreases) in Neo-European influence experience growth accelerations (decelerations). Countries without constitutional change do barely register any growth effects. Aggregating constitutional changes in an event study fashion along the lines of Figure 3 is suggestive but a formal analysis of these trends is required. Below we explore the relationship further and also examine whether the 20-year time horizon is sufficient to inform us about the growth effects of Neo-European influence.

III. Estimation Approach

Tracing the effects of constitutional changes across 183 countries and two centuries imposes considerable demands on the data. The long time horizon limits the covariates for which data is readily available. Country-specific factor endowments, geography or colonial status may well influence growth, but due to data constraints we can only include fixed effects to capture the systematic impact of such variables. These limitations of the panel structure in the context of constitutions and development are well known; see the discussion by Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) who cover a 40-year panel. We follow their identification approach in our 200-year panel.

Another important caveat is that our results rely on the assumption that effects of constitutional change are not systematically correlated with the occurrence of constitutional change itself. This assumption is violated if countries self-select into constitutional changes based on existing or expected economic growth rates. As in Persson and Tabellini (2008), we find the time series exploration of this issue to be beyond the scope of this paper due to data constraints. We take comfort, however, in the results of Hayo and Voigt (2013) who investigate the potential endogeneity of constitutional change. They find that political institutions may be endogenous, but they are influenced by political and not economic conditions.

III.1 Panel Methodology

Our dependent variable is the average annual per capita income growth rate in country i from year t to the end of a given event horizon, T : $y_{i,t+T}$. To trace the effects of constitutional changes on growth, we correlate the evolution of each country's similarity measure in year t , $s_{ij,t}$, with the subsequent growth rate across different event horizons:

$$y_{i,t+T} = \alpha + \beta s_{ij,t} + c_i + c_t + u_{i,t} \quad . \quad (2)$$

We could, of course, correlate constitutional similarity simply with the subsequent year's growth rate, i.e. for the case when $T=1$. But it is likely that constitutional changes take time to exert effects on the economy, hence we examine below a number of time horizons ranging from 5 to 50 years. Note that equation (2) includes country and year fixed effects, c_i and c_t , which capture time-invariant country characteristics such as latitude, legal origin, colonial status, climate, and settler mortality, as well as worldwide growth trends.¹⁴

IV. Results

European influence is generally assumed to aid development. We therefore expect $\beta > 0$ in (2), indicating that a country's increased (decreased) constitution similarity with a Neo-European reference country is associated with a rise (drop) in a country's subsequent growth rate. We have no priors on how fast or how long constitutional change impacts growth, and hence we vary the event horizon in 5-year increments from 5 to 50 years. Finally, we want to emphasize that our results pertain to a much broader set of constitutional features than the existing literature which, as discussed earlier, focuses mostly on the impact of democratization on development. Indeed, we allow the entire spectrum of constitutional dimensions to proxy for European influence, ranging from legislative rules over provisions covering elections, executive constraints, judiciary independence, and federalism to human rights. Initially we combine all dimensions in a single similarity measure. Later on we disentangle the effects of individual constitution dimensions on economic development.

IV.1 Constitutional Change and Growth: A Benchmark

Table 2 reports our benchmark results for the fixed effects regression in (2). To control for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, we report Newey-West standard errors with 4 lags throughout.¹⁵ The estimated similarity coefficients are positive and statistically significant for all event horizons (at the 1 or 5 percent level in most cases). The magnitudes imply substantial economic significance: A one standard deviation increase in similarity to the US constitution is associated with a 0.2 to 0.4 percentage point increase in a country's average growth rate,

¹⁴ We also estimated (2) after normalizing countries' growth rates with the reference nation's growth rate which is an alternative approach to purge our long time series from the effects of worldwide growth trends. The results are qualitatively similar in that case (and available upon request).

¹⁵ The results are virtually identical when we extend the lag length to 8.

depending on the event horizon. The magnitude of the similarity coefficients is remarkably robust over time.

These results provide substantial support for the hypothesis that Neo-European influence, in the form of constitutional similarity, is associated with positive economic outcomes in the short and long term. More importantly, the results confirm that over the past 200 years countries had the opportunity to overcome unfavorable initial conditions by actively adopting positive Neo-European influence through constitutional changes. In the subsequent sections, we will examine the robustness of our core result by considering different specifications, estimation approaches, country subsets, and reference constitutions.

IV.2 Accounting for Political Turmoil

Alesina et al. (1996) provide evidence that countries suffering from political instability grow significantly slower, perhaps due to the increased risk of government collapse. Treisman (2000), Persson and Tabellini (2003) and Persson (2004, 2005) all report positive effects of constitutional stability (measured by the age of a democracy) on economic development without identifying a particular mechanism. Our dataset contains a natural measure of political (in)stability which allows us to account for this channel: frequent constitutional adjustments. Figure 4 illustrates that countries with more frequent constitutional changes are also more likely to experience “similarity reversals,” i.e. constitutional changes that are overturned after a few years.¹⁶ When gains of greater Neo-European influence are quickly reversed, we should not expect a lasting impact on development. To account for this phenomenon, we define a political turmoil indicator which takes the value one if a country experiences two or more constitutional changes within a decade.¹⁷

Table 3a reports regression results that include our turmoil indicator and its interaction with the similarity measure. The coefficients of the turmoil variable and the turmoil-similarity interaction allow us to estimate separate effects of constitution similarity for turmoil and non-turmoil countries using the delta method. The similarity coefficient now represents the effect of Neo-European influence associated with subsequent changes in the growth rate for non-turmoil

¹⁶ To account for differences in data availability, Figure 4 expresses the number of constitutional changes and similarity reversals as share of the respective country’s number of years in the sample.

¹⁷ Increasing the turmoil range beyond 10 years yields similar results, generally with increased significance. The estimates are of similar magnitude and significance if we use a turmoil definition that considers only constitutional events which contain exact similarity reversals, although the “in turmoil” share of the sample is reduced in that case.

countries, while the same effect for turmoil countries is given by the composite of the similarity coefficient and the turmoil-similarity interaction.

The effects for non-turmoil countries are now of a slightly greater magnitude than before and the similarity coefficients are significant at the one percent level for all event horizons. For turmoil countries we find substantially weaker, statistically insignificant and at times even negative growth effects of Neo-European influence. The marginal effect of European influence on turmoil countries, as provided by the turmoil-similarity interaction coefficient, is negative throughout. Table 3a thus indicates the importance of accounting for differences in political stability across countries as we examine the relationship between Neo-European influence and growth. From here on we therefore include turmoil controls in all of our regressions.¹⁸

Figure 5 plots the economic growth effects of a one standard deviation increase in constitution similarity for non-turmoil countries across event horizons. The positive association of increased Neo-European influence with a country's growth performance ranges from 0.4 percentage points at the 5-year event horizon to 0.3 percentage points at the 50-year event horizon. Figure 5 nicely highlights how the effects of constitutional change start strong, decline somewhat in the intermediate term and remain substantial up to the 50-year time horizon.

IV.3 Differenced Results

The alternative to the panel approach with fixed effects is to examine a differenced version of (2) to account for time-invariant, country-specific factors which could affect the growth rate around the time of a constitutional change. In particular, we can compare the change in a country's growth rate T years before and after constitutional events, $y_{i,t+T} - y_{i,t-T}$, as given by:¹⁹

$$y_{i,t+T} - y_{i,t-T} = \beta_D (s_{ij,t} - s_{ij,t-T}) + c_t - c_{t-T} + u_{i,t} - u_{i,t-T} \quad . \quad (3)$$

The results for regression (3) in Table 3b are similar to Table 3a, although in the short run (5-15 years) the similarity coefficients are less significant while the long-run estimates (post 40 years) are greater in magnitude. The stability of the differenced results greatly reduce concerns about autocorrelation or spurious regressions in our long time series. Autocorrelation could also be

¹⁸ We also considered as an alternative instability measure a dummy for wars or inter-state conflicts from the Correlates of War database (www.correlatesofwar.org); our estimates remain robust to the inclusion of this measure.

¹⁹ A constant term could be inserted in (3) to account for changes in global growth trends over time; results are qualitatively identical in that case.

addressed by employing a dynamic panel estimator. We therefore also estimated equation (2) using the System-GMM approach of Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998). The estimates were again remarkably similar to our benchmark in Table 3a, both in terms of statistical and economic significance. The detailed results are available on request.

IV.4 Neo-European Influence on Growth in Subsamples of Countries

The positive correlation between European influence in terms of constitutional similarity and growth may well depend on specific subsamples of countries. Regional dummies are prominent in growth regressions and we therefore first examined whether the results are driven by particular continents. When excluding countries from one continent at a time (to maintain sufficient observations and power of prediction), we find results similar to Table 3a throughout. To conserve space, we do not report these estimates here but they are available on request. We focus below instead on specific subsamples of countries that have been theoretically linked to different theories of development and European influence.

IV.4.1 Democracies vs. Autocracies

A sizable literature examines the effect of transitions from non-democratic to democratic regimes on economic development. Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008) and Acemoglu et al. (forthcoming) find that democratizations substantially increase income in the long run, while Rodrik and Wazciarg (2005) and Hausmann et al. (2005) estimate modest short-run effects of democratization or even positive effects for autocratic transitions. Hence, we are interested in examining if European influence has a differential effect on growth in democratic and autocratic countries. Table 3c reports results for the subsample of democratic countries, while Table 3d performs the same exercise for autocratic countries.²⁰

Based on the results in Tables 3c and 3d, we can conclude that democracies exhibit a stronger relationship between European influence and growth than autocracies, both in terms of economic and statistical significance. These results support the hypothesis of Clague et al. (1996) who show that autocratic regimes have fewer incentives to enforce constitutionally guaranteed property and contract rights. Our findings are also in line with Rodrik's (1999b) hypothesis that democracies enjoy higher wages due to more political competition and participation, which are

²⁰ We identify democracies and autocracies based on the Polity IV database.

crucial factors for successfully implementing constitutional adjustments. Importantly, in addition to the established result that democracy matters for development, our estimates indicate that European influence is associated with larger growth effects in countries that have already achieved some measure of democracy.²¹

IV.4.2 Neo-European Constitutional Influence on Former Colonies

Colonial history has been central to the debate surrounding initial political conditions, European influence and economic outcomes. Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002) provide two theories that link colonial experiences (settlement vs. extraction colonies) to subsequent development paths. Empirical tests suggest that these theories can explain substantial development differences. Their subsample of former colonies has received immense attention in the development literature, and the Acemoglu et al. results have remained largely robust to the inclusion of alternative candidate hypotheses, such as geography (e.g., McArthur and Sachs 2001, and Sachs 2003), ecological and agricultural conditions (e.g., Diamond 1997, and Easterly and Levine 2003), or trade (e.g., Rodrik et al. 2004). The hallmark of this branch of the literature is its focus on initial conditions, i.e. events in the distant past that created the differential development outcomes that we observe today. The nature of this approach implies the absence of a specified mechanism by which today's income disparities have been created over the past several hundred years. Put simply, this line of research does not focus on identifying exact linkages that show if or how unfavorable initial conditions can subsequently be overcome.

The advantage of our dataset is that it can speak exactly to this question. We have shown that over the past 200 years it has been possible for countries to actively increase or decrease European influence in the form of constitutional changes, and to subsequently experience positive or negative growth effects. In this section, we examine if the same mechanism holds true for colonies which, as the previous literature has documented, have been fundamentally impacted by initial conditions in the distant past. To do so, we introduce in Table 4a a colony dummy that takes the value one if a country was ever colonized. We also include interactions of the dummy with the constitutional similarity and turmoil variables, respectively. Note that the table only

²¹ We also examined the robustness of the results when including the democracy and education controls from Murin and Wacziarg's (2014), which are available for 70 countries on a decadal basis dating back to 1870. The similarity estimates remain qualitatively identical, while the democracy variable is only weakly statistically significant in the very long run (post the 40-year event horizon).

reports results for the colony-interaction terms, since the colony dummy itself is subsumed by the country fixed effects.

The top two rows in Table 4a report composite effects of constitution similarity on growth in colonies without and with political turmoil, respectively. The next two rows report the equivalent results for countries without a colonial history. In the absence of political turmoil, colonies and non-colonies exhibit the same, positive association of Neo-European influence with growth accelerations that we previously observed in the global sample. Importantly, these results imply that non-colonies *and* colonies alike have been able to overcome (unfavorable) initial conditions by dialing up the amount of European influence in the form of constitutional similarity. According to the estimates in Table 4a, a one standard deviation increase in the similarity measure is associated with a subsequent increase in a country's growth rate by 0.3 to 0.5 percentage points for non-turmoil colonies, depending on the considered event horizon. In line with our results for the global sample, we again do not observe robust effects of Neo-European influence for countries in turmoil, neither for colonies nor non-colonies.

One might expect the results in Table 4a to be sensitive to the choice of the reference constitution, as it is often thought that colonies develop a special relationship with their respective colonizer. To explore this hypothesis, we re-estimate the specification in Table 4a with similarity measures that are based on the match of each colony with its respective colonizer as reference constitution.²² For non-turmoil countries, the coefficients in Table 4b now exhibit even greater statistical significance and larger economic magnitudes than before. In fact, the associated growth effects in colonies after adopting Neo-European constitutional elements from colonizers now exceeds those of non-colonies that adopt US constitutional measures. One possible explanation for the increased effects may be that constitutional adjustments toward the former colonizer are more effective in stimulating growth because these changes better match already existing political institutions in colonies. The results in Table 4b serve as further

²² In particular, we match former colonies in our sample with the following reference constitutions of former colonizers: UK (61 countries), France (25 countries), Spain (23 countries), Netherlands (3 countries), Italy (2 countries), and Germany (1 country). For non-colonies we retain the US constitution as reference.

evidence that colonies could overcome adverse initial conditions in the distant past by dialing up European influence in the form of increased constitutional similarity.²³

V. Which Dimensions of Constitutions Deliver Growth?

Until now we aggregated all constitutional dimensions into a single similarity measure to gauge Neo-European influence on growth. It may well be, however, that certain constitutional changes generate more profound effects than others. To examine which types of constitutional adjustments are more conducive to long-term development, we generate below similarity sub-indices for six distinct dimensions of constitutions.

In the category *Judiciary Rules*, we include constitutional rules pertaining to constitutional design, legal processes and rights. *Elections* contains provisions related to electoral rules, and *Individual and Human Rights* reflects basic rights such as free speech, academic freedom, and health/poverty entitlements. *Executive Constraints* captures checks and balances on the executive and the legislative bodies. The *Legislative Rules* dimension covers legislative processes, powers, and impeachment procedures, and *Federalism* indicates powers of sub-national governments. Table A.2 in the Appendix specifies all constitutional rules that comprise each of the six dimensions. Results for the growth effects of the individual categories are reported in Table 5a. For each event horizon, we employ the fixed effects specification in equation (2) and regress growth on all six constitutional dimensions and their respective turmoil interactions.²⁴ All similarity measures are included in each regression to preempt omitted variable bias, since constitutional events often involve simultaneous changes in multiple dimensions. As before, we only report the estimates with the US as reference constitution. However, the results are robust to replacing the US with the respective constitutions of former colonizers (detailed results are available on request).

Table 5a shows that the effects of the different constitutional dimensions on growth are remarkably diverse. Focusing on non-turmoil countries, European influence in terms of

²³ We have also rerun all other tables with the similarity measures that match colonies with their former colonizer as reference (detailed estimates are available on request). The results are similar if not marginally stronger. For generality's sake we prefer, however, a uniform reference constitution in all other tables.

²⁴ We do not report coefficient estimates for the marginal effects (interactions) in Table 5a to conserve space. Complete results are available upon request.

Legislative rules has a positive and significant effect over the 20- to 35-year event horizons. The *Legislative* dimension covers rules that regulate the legislature's involvement in constitutional changes, veto powers, the structure of the legislature, and disclosure and removal procedures for individual legislators (see Table A.2). The positive effects of the legislative dimension are therefore in line with the argument that Neo-European style checks and balances on legislative procedures promote high-quality institutions and better development outcomes.

We also find positive effects for *Human Rights* in the short to medium run in non-turmoil countries, a dimension which to date has not been discussed as a development determinant beyond general references to the effect of civil liberties. Knack and Keefer (1995) unsuccessfully examined an index of civil liberties as a potential determinant for “the quality of the institutions that protect property rights.”²⁵ Barro (1997) finds the same civil liberties index to be correlated with the effect of democracy on growth, but he does not specify a channel through which civil liberties might influence development outcomes. In our data, *Human Rights* capture features of constitutions that stipulate freedoms of religion/assembly/association as well as protections against discrimination. Our results are the first to indicate at least temporary positive growth effects when non-turmoil countries adopt human rights as specified in Neo-European constitutions.

The Neo-European *Federalism* dimension features limited positive growth effects for about 25 years in non-turmoil countries, while a shift towards Neo-European *Judiciary Rules* are followed by long term growth accelerations (40 years and longer). In our data, the *Judiciary* dimension captures legal procedures and rights, as well as the protection of private property. Neo-European *Executive Constraints* are associated with growth accelerations throughout, confirming the hypothesis that *Executive Constraints* are a crucial development determinant, which is in line with the earlier evidence that dates back to Knack and Keefer (1997) and Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002). These studies argue that limits to the power of political leaders in the form of checks on the executive and electoral competition are conducive to the provision of secure property rights.

²⁵ Their civil liberties measure aggregates indicators for free speech, rights to organize/demonstrate, and rights to personal autonomy (freedom of religion, education, travel, and other personal rights); see Gastil (1986–87).

The previous literature proxied executive constraints with an amalgam indicator from the Polity IV dataset that subjectively assigns values for countries' openness, competitiveness of chief executive recruitment, and constraints on executive authority. Our data on executive constraints instead provides a rich codification of actual constitutional elements, ranging from the type of chief executive (including its election) to replacement mechanisms, as well as the powers to declare war and states of emergency (see Table A.2 for a detailed list of the considered constitutional provisions).

The results for the *Elections* dimension in non-turmoil countries are somewhat confounding. The adoption of Neo-European electoral rules seems to have no growth effects in the short and intermediate term, and generates positive but insignificant effects only in the very long run. Most surprising, however, is the negative, significant effect for the 20-year event horizon. This finding is counterintuitive for two reasons. First, Persson and Tabellini (2003) established strong effects of electoral rules on economic outcomes (although in a much shorter panel). And second, the electoral rules in our US benchmark case cover utterly fundamental aspects of elections such as the right to vote, universal suffrage, and a congress elected by the people.

We suspect that electoral freedom and democratic elections alone may not be sufficient to generate good development outcomes in the absence of adequate executive constraints. That is, free elections in a dictatorship are unlikely to produce Neo-European style political institutions. To examine the effect of executive constraints on electoral rules we add in Table 5b an interaction between *Elections* and *Executive Constraints* (including the appropriate turmoil interactions). In this way, we can examine whether the degree of adopted Neo-European executive constraints influences the effects of Neo-European style electoral rules. Table 5b shows that the results for all dimensions other than *Elections* and *Executive Constraints* are nearly unchanged compared to Table 5a. However, for non-turmoil countries we now find that except for the very short run the effect of *Executive Constraints* (evaluated at the mean of the *Elections* dimension) increases in magnitude throughout. At the same time, the significant negative impact of *Elections* (evaluated at the mean on the *Executive Constraints* dimension) vanishes and even turns positive and significant in the long run (40-45 years). These results indicate that the simultaneous adoption of constitutional rules which provide for both Neo-European style elections and executive constraints has indeed a positive impact on development.

Figure 6 illustrates this point in more detail; when executive constraints are not sufficiently similar to Neo-European standards (the similarity coefficient for *Executive Constraints* is negative), the adoption of Neo-European style electoral rules actually has a negative impact on growth. When *Executive Constraints* are similar to Neo-European constitutions (the similarity coefficient is positive), adopting Neo-European electoral rules is associated with a positive effect on growth.

In related previous work, La Porta et al. (2004) hypothesized that *Judicial Checks and Balances* anchored in the constitution are the underlying determinants of political and economic freedoms. In particular, they suggest that the degree of *Judicial Independence* and *Constitutional Review* procedures constitute key political institutions for development. We therefore want to examine whether our constitutional dimension results are robust to the inclusion of these variables. Based on the information in the CCP data, we follow the La Porta et al. (2004) approach and construct two indices that capture countries' judicial independence and constitutional review procedures to examine their hypothesis in our over 200-year long panel. Table A.3 in the Appendix provides the exact definitions of the two La Porta et al. (2004) indices and also describes our coding approach based on the information in the CCP data. Table 5c presents the dimension results when we replace our *Judiciary* category with the two La Porta et al. indices (including again the *Elections/Executive Constraints* interaction). The results indicate that accounting for *Judicial Independence* and *Constitutional Review* leaves the results of the other dimensions mostly unchanged. Moreover, we find strong support for the La Porta et al. (2004) hypothesis that *Judicial Independence* and *Constitutional Review* positively affect political and economic outcomes throughout, with the statistical significance showing somewhat stronger effects for the *Constitutional Review* index. And importantly, while these results confirm the findings of La Porta et al. (2004), they also highlight that the previously identified growth effects for the other constitutional dimensions are robust.

VI. Endogeneity and Omitted Variable Bias

In any panel of countries that assesses growth determinants, endogeneity potentially looms large. We cannot address endogeneity bias in a dataset dating back to 1800. Even if we developed plausible theories/instruments, the data is simply not available for the unprecedented length of

this panel. The long time span of the panel might also introduce omitted variable bias since we cannot directly control for all potential growth determinants (beyond those that are captured by country and time fixed effects). Nevertheless, we would like to make inroads and understand the severity of potential endogeneity and omitted variable concerns. To address both endogeneity and omitted variable concerns, we focus in this part on a shorter, post-WWII panel of countries for which data on a wide range of alternative growth determinants and instruments is available. Indeed, we include all alternative growth determinants that have been suggested for any growth panel to date. Our results provide further support for the estimates from the longer panel; European constitutional influence significantly increases economic growth even after we control for endogeneity and omitted variables, albeit in a shorter panel.

Before laying out our empirical strategy, it should be noted that similar issues of omitted variable bias are also faced by an influential strand of the development accounting literature that regresses income level regressions on a single institutional variable (see, e.g., Hall and Jones 1999, and Acemoglu et al. 2001, 2002). If effects are found in such regressions, they are usually thought to represent upper bounds. However, in contrast to these studies where data on alternative development determinants exist, the length of our panel simply does not provide us with any additional controls that *could* be included over the entire time span since 1800.

One approach to addressing endogeneity is to examine the effects of changes in European influence with up to a 50-year lag, as we have previously done. The longer the considered time horizons, the less likely it is that subsequent growth rates predetermined earlier constitutional change. This argument is admittedly no silver bullet to the endogeneity question. As alluded to above, we can address endogeneity and omitted variables bias only if we are willing to reduce the time horizon of the panel. Below we follow the state-of-the-art econometric approach (including variable selection) to deal with endogeneity in a panel of countries that was established by Barro's (2003) seminal paper on growth determinants. Durlauf et al. (2008) extended Barro's dataset to include social capital and detailed religious variables as additional controls. The Durlauf et al. dataset was again updated by Henderson et al. (2011) who considered the importance of nonlinearities among growth determinants. Using the same instrumental variable framework as the previous literature dating back to Barro (2003), Eicher and Kuenzel (2016) augmented the Henderson et al. dataset to examine the effects of trade openness and diversification on growth. The dataset represents to date the most comprehensive set of growth

determinants in a panel both in terms of time coverage (1965-2009) and the number of included control variables (38). We add our European influence variables to this dataset to again assess their impact on economic growth. While we are able to account for both endogeneity and omitted variable bias, we cannot implement these empirics back to 1800 due to missing data prior to 1965.

The panel dataset includes controls/proxies for seven different growth theories, including regressors suggested by I) neoclassical growth theory (initial per capita income, population growth, investment, and education). The literature instruments all four variables with one-period lagged values. Also included are II) proxies for demographic change (life expectancy, fertility), and III) theories that link macroeconomic policies to growth (export diversity, government consumption, openness, and average changes in the CPI). Again, we follow the literature and the latter three variables are instrumented with their respective lagged values. We also consider IV) regressors that link geography to growth (land area within 100km of ice-free coast, percent tropical land area) and V) theories linking institutions to growth (risk of expropriation, constraints on the executive, and a governance index). In addition, we include dummy variables for the English and French origin of a country's legal system and use lagged values of the expropriation risk as instrument for the current value of the same variable. VI) Theories relating to religion and growth are proxied using the share of all major religions in a country's population (Eastern, Hindu, Jewish, Muslim, Orthodox, Protestant, and Other Religions). As in the previous panel growth determinants literature, we use the respective religious shares in 1900 as instruments. Finally, we also include regressors capturing VII) theories that predict a detrimental effect of ethnic tensions on growth (using linguistic fractionalization and ethnic tension indices). Exact definitions and sources of each variable are provided in the data appendix of Eicher and Kuenzel (2016). Most importantly, we also include in each period the constitutional similarity measure, which we instrument with its lagged value to address endogeneity concerns.²⁶ The dataset is an unbalanced panel of 81 countries and uses 5-year averages to smoothen business cycles. In total, it is comprised of 579 country-period observations.

²⁶ We experimented with up to 4 period lags as instruments for our constitution similarity variable and find results to be robust.

Table 6 reports the results of both simple OLS (columns 1-3) and 2SLS (columns 4-6) regressions.²⁷ Columns 1 and 4 show results without accounting for European influence. The remaining specifications introduce the constitution similarity measure as well as the political turmoil controls. Three key insights emerge. First, even when controlling for the most comprehensive list of potential growth determinants in a panel of countries, the OLS specification in column 2 confirms that constitution similarity is a significant growth determinant. Second, constitution similarity remains a positive and significant driver of growth even after introducing the turmoil controls (column 3) and the above discussed instrumentation approach (columns 5 and 6). Third, the coefficient magnitude for the constitution similarity measure increases as we control for endogeneity in the instrumental variable regressions. This result indicates that the OLS estimates in the 200-year panel may represent lower bounds of European influence on growth. In terms of economic significance, the results in Table 6 imply that a one standard deviation increase in European influence in the instrumented regressions is associated with a .4 percentage point increase in average annual per capita income growth.²⁸ This effect is remarkably similar to the results in the longer panel. Thus, Table 6 offers clear support for the growth effects of European influence through constitutions post 1965, a result which should further increase the confidence in our findings for the 200-year panel.

Finally, we should note that the panel dataset in this part includes dummies for UK and French legal origins. It turns out that the significant effect of UK legal origins, which was also documented in the previous literature, is assumed by the constitutional similarity variable once we use an instrumentation approach and control for political turmoil (see column 6). With regard to the remaining growth determinants, the results are in line with the previous literature; see Eicher and Kuenzel (2016) for a detailed discussion. The introduction of the European influence variables only improves the estimation without dramatically altering the conclusions for other growth determinants.

²⁷ All regressions account for time and regional (East Asia, Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa) fixed effects.

²⁸ The coefficient of 0.014 in column 6 and the 0.304 standard deviation of constitution similarity imply that a one standard deviation increase should increase growth by $100 \times 0.014 \times 0.304 = 0.426\%$.

VII. Concluding Remarks

European influence has been previously identified as a fundamental development determinant. In doing so, the existing literature has relied on indirect proxies of European influence in the very distant past as key predictors of institutional quality and economic performance in modern times. It remains unclear, however, how exactly European influence in the distant past has translated into differential development outcomes over the past 200 years. In this paper, we offer a clear and quantifiable mechanism of European influence on economic performance over this time period. Specifically, we suggest that the adoption of European-style constitutional rules allowed countries to actively dial European influence up or down over the course of their development. We then quantify the associated growth effects of European influence from 1800 to 2008.

The analysis yields five important results. First, we document that the effect of European influence on countries' growth rates is economically and statistically significant. The magnitude of the effect varies over time, but it can last for up to 50 years. Thus, greater European influence has allowed countries to close the gap to the technology and income frontier through growth accelerations over the entire 200-year time horizon that we consider. Most importantly, dialing up European influence makes it feasible for countries to overcome unfavorable initial conditions. Second, throughout all considered time horizons, we find strong evidence for growth accelerations after increases in European-style executive constraints, and positive medium- to long-term effects after the adoption of legislative and judiciary rules. On the other hand, changes in constitutional rules pertaining to federalism and human rights are only associated with faster growth over the short and medium term. At the same time, the effect of elections is moderated by the strength of executive constraints: European style electoral rules are shown to be beneficial to growth only when executive constraints are sufficiently similar to European standards. Third, our results show that phases of political turmoil negate positive effects of European influence. Fourth, both colonies and non-colonies benefit from European influence in terms of constitutional similarity, although the associated growth effects are slightly smaller for colonies. And fifth, we document that democratic countries experience much stronger growth effects compared to autocracies after adopting elements of European constitutions.

Nevertheless, approaching the evolution of European influence on growth over the past 200 years is subject to a number of caveats. Data constraints limit the questions we can ask,

especially those related to the endogeneity of political change and the inclusion of control variables. We take solace in the fact that identical problems have been encountered by all papers in the literature examining similar features of growth over shorter time horizons (usually 40 years at the most). We hope to have opened a new focus in the development literature that tries to identify the *channel* by which European influence can affect growth. The robustness of our results across reference constitutions and empirical methodologies should provide confidence in our findings.

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
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
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Figure 1: Constitutional Similarity across Countries and Time




Notes: The figure plots kernel densities of countries' constitutions for the baseline sample of 10,893 countries, differentiated by time periods. Here the US is the reference constitution.

Figure 2: Changes in Constitutional Similarity




Notes: The figure plots changes in constitutional similarities for 557 observations in our benchmark sample. Here the US is the reference constitution.

Figure 3: Growth Rates before and after Changes in Constitutional Similarity




Notes: The figure pools observations and plots the average of the annual growth rate of countries 20 years before and after constitutional changes. Here the US is the reference constitution.

Figure 4: Constitutional Changes and Similarity Reversals




Notes: The figure plots constitutional changes versus constitutional reversals as share of each country's years in the sample. Constitutional reversals occur when a specific constitutional change is overturned within 10 years. Here the US is the reference constitution.

Figure 5: Changes in Growth Due to Increases in Neo-European Influence



Notes: Changes in growth rates due to a 1 StDev increase in constitution similarity for non-turmoil countries across event horizons ranging from 5 to 50 years (based on coefficients in Table 3a). Here the US is the reference constitution. 90 percent confidence intervals included.

Figure 6: Executive Constraints Moderate the Effect of Free Elections on Growth



Notes: Changes in growth rates due to a 1 StDev increase in *Elections* similarity for the 40-year event horizon (based on coefficients in Table 5b). Here the US is the reference constitution. 90 percent confidence intervals included.

Table 2: Constitutional Similarity and Growth – A Benchmark

Dep. Variable: Average Annual Growth Rate	Event horizon, T									
	(1) 5 years	(2) 10 years	(3) 15 years	(4) 20 years	(5) 25 years	(6) 30 years	(7) 35 years	(8) 40 years	(9) 45 years	(10) 50 years
Constitution Similarity	0.012*** (0.004)	0.008** (0.004)	0.006** (0.003)	0.005* (0.003)	0.005** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)
Constant	-0.000 (0.013)	-0.015* (0.009)	-0.015*** (0.004)	-0.019*** (0.002)	-0.016*** (0.002)	-0.015*** (0.003)	-0.016*** (0.003)	-0.017*** (0.003)	-0.015*** (0.003)	-0.012*** (0.002)
Observations	10,893	9,269	8,377	7,531	6,773	6,032	5,349	4,721	4,292	3,848
R2	0.275	0.235	0.322	0.406	0.484	0.525	0.552	0.544	0.533	0.475
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: Newey-West standard errors (with 4 lags) in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate 1, 5, 10 percent significance levels.

Table 3a: Constitutional Similarity and Growth – Accounting for Political Turmoil

Dep. Variable: Average Annual Growth Rate	Event horizon, T									
	(11) 5 years	(12) 10 years	(13) 15 years	(14) 20 years	(15) 25 years	(16) 30 years	(17) 35 years	(18) 40 years	(19) 45 years	(20) 50 years
Constitution Similarity (Non-Turmoil Countries)	0.014*** (0.004)	0.011*** (0.004)	0.009*** (0.003)	0.007*** (0.003)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)	0.009*** (0.002)	0.009*** (0.002)	0.010*** (0.002)
Constitutional Similarity[♠] (Turmoil Countries)	0.000 (0.006)	-0.007 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.006* (0.003)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)	0.000 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)
Turmoil	-0.002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.002* (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Turmoil x Constitution Similarity	-0.014** (0.006)	-0.018*** (0.004)	-0.014*** (0.003)	-0.013*** (0.003)	-0.010*** (0.003)	-0.010*** (0.003)	-0.007*** (0.003)	-0.007*** (0.003)	-0.006** (0.003)	-0.006** (0.003)
Constant	0.001 (0.013)	-0.015* (0.009)	-0.016*** (0.005)	-0.020*** (0.003)	-0.018*** (0.002)	-0.016*** (0.003)	-0.016*** (0.003)	-0.016*** (0.003)	-0.015*** (0.003)	-0.012*** (0.002)
Observations	10,893	9,533	8,581	7,713	6,928	6,159	5,411	4,755	4,303	3,848
- of which are in turmoil	1,159	1,091	945	799	681	582	508	434	389	362
R2	0.277	0.394	0.476	0.556	0.614	0.655	0.674	0.672	0.669	0.651
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: ♠ Composite effect calculated with the Delta method. Newey-West standard errors (with 4 lags) in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate 1, 5, 10 percent significance levels.

Table 3b: Constitutional Similarity and Growth – Differenced Regressions

Dep. Variable: Change in Average Annual Growth Rate	Event horizon, T									
	(21) 5 years	(22) 10 years	(23) 15 years	(24) 20 years	(25) 25 years	(26) 30 years	(27) 35 years	(28) 40 years	(29) 45 years	(30) 50 years
Change in Constitution Similarity (Non-Turmoil Countries)	0.002 (0.007)	0.001 (0.004)	0.008 (0.005)	0.010* (0.006)	0.008 (0.005)	0.005* (0.003)	0.007*** (0.003)	0.011*** (0.003)	0.014*** (0.003)	0.018*** (0.004)
Change in Constitutional Similarity[♠] (Turmoil Countries)	-0.003 (0.010)	-0.008 (0.008)	0.000 (0.008)	-0.014** (0.007)	-0.010 (0.008)	-0.003 (0.010)	0.005 (0.013)	0.002 (0.010)	0.009 (0.008)	0.019*** (0.006)
Turmoil	-0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.003 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	0.005 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.007** (0.003)
Turmoil x Change in Constitution Similarity	-0.005 (0.011)	-0.008 (0.008)	-0.008 (0.008)	-0.024*** (0.009)	-0.017* (0.009)	-0.008 (0.010)	-0.002 (0.013)	-0.008 (0.010)	-0.005 (0.009)	0.001 (0.007)
Observations	9,929	7,725	6,180	4,817	3,686	2,906	2,441	1,993	1,632	1,373
- of which are in turmoil	1,044	873	678	512	324	222	170	127	107	89
R2	0.141	0.151	0.204	0.255	0.295	0.307	0.296	0.330	0.394	0.455
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: ♠ Composite effect calculated with the Delta method. Newey-West standard errors (with 4 lags) in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate 1, 5, 10 percent significance levels.

Table 3c: Constitutional Similarity and Growth – Democratic Countries

Dep. Variable: Average Annual Growth Rate	Event horizon, T									
	(31) 5 years	(32) 10 years	(33) 15 years	(34) 20 years	(35) 25 years	(36) 30 years	(37) 35 years	(38) 40 years	(39) 45 years	(40) 50 years
Constitution Similarity (Non-Turmoil Countries)	0.022*** (0.005)	0.020*** (0.004)	0.016*** (0.003)	0.015*** (0.003)	0.014*** (0.003)	0.015*** (0.003)	0.015*** (0.003)	0.015*** (0.003)	0.014*** (0.003)	0.011*** (0.003)
Constitutional Similarity[♠] (Turmoil Countries)	0.022*** (0.006)	0.019*** (0.005)	0.016*** (0.004)	0.014*** (0.005)	0.013*** (0.005)	0.016*** (0.005)	0.016*** (0.005)	0.014*** (0.004)	0.016*** (0.004)	0.014*** (0.004)
Turmoil	-0.003 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.004*** (0.002)	0.003* (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)
Turmoil x Constitution Similarity	-0.000 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.000 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)	0.002 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)
Constant	0.026*** (0.007)	0.048*** (0.005)	0.043*** (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.000 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.005)	0.000 (0.005)	0.001 (0.005)	0.001 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)
Observations	4,797	3,991	3,491	3,055	2,779	2,547	2,332	2,123	1,950	1,768
- of which are in turmoil	345	315	252	164	145	137	131	113	99	86
R2	0.349	0.507	0.572	0.621	0.676	0.726	0.759	0.770	0.767	0.756
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: ♠ Composite effect calculated with the Delta method. Newey-West standard errors (with 4 lags) in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate 1, 5, 10 percent significance levels.

Table 3d: Constitutional Similarity and Growth – Autocratic Countries

Dep. Variable: Average Annual Growth Rate	Event horizon, T									
	(41) 5 years	(42) 10 years	(43) 15 years	(44) 20 years	(45) 25 years	(46) 30 years	(47) 35 years	(48) 40 years	(49) 45 years	(50) 50 years
Constitution Similarity (Non-Turmoil Countries)	0.007 (0.008)	0.006 (0.007)	0.005 (0.005)	0.004 (0.004)	0.004 (0.004)	0.005* (0.003)	0.007*** (0.003)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)
Constitutional Similarity[♠] (Turmoil Countries)	-0.004 (0.007)	-0.015** (0.006)	-0.010** (0.005)	-0.008** (0.004)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)	0.000 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	0.005 (0.004)
Turmoil	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)
Turmoil x Constitution Similarity	-0.011 (0.008)	-0.022*** (0.006)	-0.015*** (0.005)	-0.012*** (0.004)	-0.009** (0.004)	-0.010*** (0.004)	-0.007** (0.003)	-0.005 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)
Constant	-0.009 (0.012)	-0.015 (0.010)	-0.017*** (0.006)	-0.024*** (0.005)	-0.020*** (0.003)	-0.016*** (0.003)	-0.016*** (0.004)	-0.016*** (0.003)	-0.016*** (0.003)	-0.012*** (0.003)
Observations	5,244	4,810	4,481	4,161	3,767	3,331	2,876	2,463	2,195	1,926
- of which are in turmoil	747	709	628	580	494	416	353	298	266	254
R2	0.318	0.429	0.509	0.591	0.648	0.693	0.711	0.716	0.713	0.678
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: ♠ Composite effect calculated with the Delta method. Newey-West standard errors (with 4 lags) in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate 1, 5, 10 percent significance levels.

Table 4a: Constitutional Similarity and Growth – Neo-European Influence on Colonies

Dep. Variable: Average Annual Growth Rate		Event horizon, T									
		(51) 5 years	(52) 10 years	(53) 15 years	(54) 20 years	(55) 25 years	(56) 30 years	(57) 35 years	(58) 40 years	(59) 45 years	(60) 50 years
Colonies	Constitution Similarity [♠] (Non-Turmoil)	0.016*** (0.006)	0.011** (0.005)	0.008* (0.004)	0.006 (0.004)	0.005 (0.004)	0.006** (0.003)	0.007** (0.003)	0.009*** (0.003)	0.012*** (0.002)	0.014*** (0.002)
	Constitution Similarity [♠] (Turmoil)	-0.001 (0.006)	-0.008 (0.005)	-0.007* (0.004)	-0.007** (0.004)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)	0.001 (0.005)	0.003 (0.005)
Non-Colonies	Constitution Similarity (Non-Turmoil)	0.012** (0.005)	0.015*** (0.004)	0.012*** (0.003)	0.011*** (0.003)	0.010*** (0.002)	0.009*** (0.002)	0.010*** (0.002)	0.010*** (0.002)	0.009*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)
	Constitution Similarity [♠] (Turmoil)	-0.016 (0.013)	-0.018* (0.010)	-0.012 (0.010)	-0.013 (0.008)	-0.006 (0.006)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.006 (0.005)
Interactions	Colony x Constitution Similarity	0.005 (0.007)	-0.004 (0.006)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	0.006** (0.003)
	Turmoil x Constitution Similarity	-0.028** (0.014)	-0.033*** (0.010)	-0.024** (0.010)	-0.025*** (0.008)	-0.016** (0.006)	-0.013** (0.005)	-0.012** (0.005)	-0.015*** (0.005)	-0.015*** (0.006)	-0.014** (0.006)
	Turmoil x Colony x Const. Sim.	0.011 (0.015)	0.014 (0.012)	0.009 (0.010)	0.011 (0.009)	0.005 (0.007)	0.003 (0.007)	0.004 (0.006)	0.006 (0.007)	0.005 (0.007)	0.003 (0.007)
	Turmoil x Colony	0.015*** (0.005)	0.011*** (0.004)	0.008** (0.004)	0.007* (0.004)	0.004 (0.004)	0.004 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	0.006* (0.003)	0.008** (0.003)	0.007** (0.003)
	Turmoil	-0.015*** (0.005)	-0.009** (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)	0.001 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.004* (0.003)
	Constant	-0.001 (0.013)	-0.015* (0.009)	-0.016*** (0.005)	-0.020*** (0.003)	-0.018*** (0.002)	-0.016*** (0.003)	-0.016*** (0.003)	-0.016*** (0.003)	-0.014*** (0.003)	-0.011*** (0.002)
Observations		10,893	9,533	8,581	7,713	6,928	6,159	5,411	4,755	4,303	3,848
- of which are in turmoil		1,159	1,091	945	799	681	582	508	434	389	362
- of which are colonies		7,894	6,749	5,949	5,232	4,592	3,962	3,363	2,842	2,490	2,136
- of which are colonies in turmoil		957	910	789	655	552	464	400	340	302	278
R2		0.279	0.396	0.477	0.558	0.615	0.655	0.675	0.674	0.672	0.655
Time FE		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: ♠ Composite effect calculated with the Delta method. Newey-West standard errors (with 4 lags) in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate 1, 5, 10 percent significance levels.

Table 4b: Constitutional Similarity and Growth – Neo-European Influence on Colonies by Respective Colonizer

Dep. Variable: Average Annual Growth Rate		Event horizon, T									
		(61) 5 years	(62) 10 years	(63) 15 years	(64) 20 years	(65) 25 years	(66) 30 years	(67) 35 years	(68) 40 years	(69) 45 years	(70) 50 years
Colonies	Constitution Similarity [♠] (Non-Turmoil)	0.017*** (0.005)	0.014*** (0.005)	0.011*** (0.004)	0.010*** (0.003)	0.011*** (0.003)	0.013*** (0.003)	0.013*** (0.002)	0.013*** (0.002)	0.014*** (0.002)	0.014*** (0.002)
	Constitution Similarity [♠] (Turmoil)	0.007 (0.007)	0.001 (0.005)	0.000 (0.004)	0.000 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.005)	0.000 (0.005)	0.003 (0.005)	0.003 (0.005)	0.007 (0.006)	0.010* (0.005)
Non-Colonies	Constitution Similarity (Non-Turmoil)	0.009* (0.005)	0.014*** (0.004)	0.011*** (0.003)	0.011*** (0.003)	0.010*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)	0.009*** (0.002)	0.010*** (0.002)	0.009*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)
	Constitution Similarity [♠] (Turmoil)	-0.018 (0.013)	-0.019* (0.010)	-0.012 (0.010)	-0.014* (0.008)	-0.006 (0.006)	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.006 (0.005)
Interactions	Colony x Constitution Similarity	0.008 (0.007)	0.000 (0.006)	0.000 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)	0.004 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	0.005* (0.003)	0.007** (0.003)
	Turmoil x Constitution Similarity	-0.027** (0.014)	-0.032*** (0.010)	-0.023** (0.010)	-0.024*** (0.008)	-0.016** (0.006)	-0.013** (0.005)	-0.012** (0.005)	-0.015*** (0.005)	-0.015*** (0.005)	-0.014** (0.005)
	Turmoil x Colony x Const. Sim.	0.016 (0.015)	0.020* (0.012)	0.012 (0.011)	0.015 (0.009)	0.003 (0.008)	0.001 (0.007)	0.002 (0.007)	0.005 (0.007)	0.008 (0.008)	0.010 (0.008)
	Turmoil x Colony	0.012** (0.005)	0.009** (0.004)	0.006 (0.004)	0.004 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)	0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)
	Turmoil	-0.015*** (0.005)	-0.009** (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)	0.001 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.004* (0.003)
	Constant	-0.006 (0.010)	-0.013* (0.007)	-0.022*** (0.004)	-0.023*** (0.002)	-0.021*** (0.002)	-0.017*** (0.003)	-0.015*** (0.002)	-0.017*** (0.002)	-0.012*** (0.002)	-0.011*** (0.002)
Observations		10,994	9,672	8,740	7,922	7,133	6,358	5,625	4,965	4,442	3,950
- of which are in turmoil		1,126	1,056	918	783	661	566	498	440	390	353
- of which are colonies		7,987	6,880	6,100	5,433	4,789	4,158	3,569	3,044	2,621	2,230
- of which are colonies in turmoil		924	875	762	639	532	448	390	346	303	269
R2		0.276	0.394	0.478	0.559	0.620	0.664	0.686	0.685	0.675	0.659
Time FE		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: ♠ Composite effect calculated with the Delta method. Newey-West standard errors (with 4 lags) in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate 1, 5, 10 percent significance levels.

Table 5a: Constitutional Similarity and Growth – Disaggregated Constitution Dimensions

Dep. Variable: Average Annual Growth Rate		Event horizon, T										
		(71) 5 years	(72) 10 years	(73) 15 years	(74) 20 years	(75) 25 years	(76) 30 years	(77) 35 years	(78) 40 years	(79) 45 years	(80) 50 years	
Constitution Similarity Dimension	Non-Turmoil Countries	Legislative	0.000 (0.004)	0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.005** (0.003)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.005** (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)
		Elections	0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002* (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)
		Executive	0.009*** (0.003)	0.006** (0.003)	0.004* (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.003* (0.002)	0.004** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.006*** (0.001)	0.007*** (0.001)
		Judiciary	0.005 (0.004)	0.004 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.004** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)
		Federalism	0.003 (0.003)	0.005** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.004** (0.002)	0.003* (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)
		Rights	0.002 (0.003)	0.003 (0.002)	0.004** (0.002)	0.003* (0.002)	0.002 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
	Composite for Turmoil Countries	Legislative [♠]	-0.005 (0.006)	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.008** (0.004)	-0.008** (0.003)	-0.009** (0.004)	-0.011*** (0.004)	-0.011*** (0.004)
		Elections [♠]	-0.013*** (0.005)	-0.012*** (0.004)	-0.009*** (0.003)	-0.007** (0.003)	-0.005** (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.002 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)
		Executive [♠]	0.014*** (0.005)	0.009** (0.004)	0.006** (0.003)	0.007** (0.003)	0.007** (0.003)	0.007** (0.003)	0.008*** (0.003)	0.008** (0.003)	0.008** (0.003)	0.006* (0.003)
		Judiciary [♠]	0.008 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.006** (0.003)	-0.005* (0.003)	-0.004 (0.003)	0.000 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	0.008** (0.004)	0.010*** (0.004)
		Federalism [♠]	0.003 (0.005)	0.004 (0.004)	0.002 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.008*** (0.002)	-0.009*** (0.003)	-0.007** (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)
		Rights [♠]	-0.004 (0.005)	0.001 (0.004)	0.004 (0.003)	0.005* (0.002)	0.006** (0.002)	0.006** (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.000 (0.002)
	Turmoil	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	
	Constant	0.005 (0.014)	-0.010 (0.010)	-0.011* (0.006)	-0.018*** (0.004)	-0.017*** (0.003)	-0.015*** (0.003)	-0.016*** (0.003)	-0.015*** (0.003)	-0.012*** (0.003)	-0.006* (0.003)	
	Observations	10,893	9,533	8,581	7,713	6,928	6,159	5,411	4,755	4,303	3,848	
	- in turmoil	1,159	1,091	945	799	681	582	508	434	389	362	
	R2	0.282	0.400	0.484	0.564	0.623	0.668	0.687	0.683	0.682	0.670	
	Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		

Notes: Constant, turmoil, and turmoil interaction coefficients are available upon request. [♠] Composite effect calculated with the Delta method. Newey-West standard errors (with 4 lags) in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate 1, 5, 10 percent significance levels.

Table 5b: Constitutional Similarity and Growth – Disaggregated Constitution Dimensions (with Election-Executive Interaction)

Dep. Variable: Average Annual Growth Rate		Event horizon, T										
		(81) 5 years	(82) 10 years	(83) 15 years	(84) 20 years	(85) 25 years	(86) 30 years	(87) 35 years	(88) 40 years	(89) 45 years	(90) 50 years	
Constitution Similarity Dimension	Non-Turmoil Countries	Legislative	0.000 (0.004)	0.000 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	0.005** (0.003)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.005*** (0.002)	0.003* (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)
		Elections	0.001 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.003* (0.002)	0.003* (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)
		Executive	0.009** (0.004)	0.005 (0.003)	0.006* (0.003)	0.006** (0.003)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)	0.009*** (0.002)	0.010*** (0.002)	0.010*** (0.002)
		Judiciary	0.005 (0.004)	0.004 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.000 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.004* (0.002)	0.005*** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)
		Federalism	0.003 (0.003)	0.005** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.005*** (0.002)	0.003** (0.002)	0.002 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)
		Rights	0.002 (0.003)	0.003 (0.002)	0.004** (0.002)	0.003* (0.002)	0.002 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)
		Composite for Turmoil Countries	Legislative	-0.005 (0.006)	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.008** (0.003)	-0.008** (0.003)	-0.009** (0.004)	-0.011*** (0.004)
	Elections	-0.013** (0.006)	-0.013*** (0.005)	-0.008** (0.003)	-0.005 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	0.005* (0.003)	0.005* (0.003)	0.005* (0.003)	
	Executive	0.014** (0.006)	0.008** (0.004)	0.007** (0.004)	0.009*** (0.003)	0.010*** (0.003)	0.010*** (0.003)	0.011*** (0.003)	0.011*** (0.003)	0.012*** (0.004)	0.010*** (0.004)	
	Judiciary	0.008 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.006* (0.003)	-0.005* (0.003)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	0.008** (0.004)	0.009*** (0.004)	
	Federalism	0.003 (0.005)	0.004 (0.004)	0.002 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.008*** (0.002)	-0.009*** (0.003)	-0.007** (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	
	Rights	-0.004 (0.005)	0.001 (0.004)	0.004 (0.003)	0.004* (0.002)	0.006** (0.003)	0.006** (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.000 (0.002)	
		Observations	10,893	9,533	8,581	7,713	6,928	6,159	5,411	4,755	4,303	3,848
		- in turmoil	1,159	1,091	945	799	681	582	508	434	389	362
	R2	0.282	0.400	0.484	0.564	0.624	0.669	0.689	0.686	0.686	0.675	
	Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
	Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	

Notes: Regressions include dimension-interactions with turmoil and *Election-Executive* interaction (plus its interaction with turmoil); constant, turmoil, and interaction coefficients are available upon request. Newey-West standard errors (with 4 lags) in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate 1, 5, 10 percent significance levels. ♠ Composite effect calculated with the Delta method. + *Elections* effects evaluated at *Executive* mean. ++ *Executive* effects evaluated at *Elections* mean.

Table 5c: Constitutional Similarity and Growth – Disaggregated Constitution Dimensions (with Election-Executive Interaction)

Dep. Variable: Average Annual Growth Rate		Event horizon, T										
		(91) 5 years	(92) 10 years	(93) 15 years	(94) 20 years	(95) 25 years	(96) 30 years	(97) 35 years	(98) 40 years	(99) 45 years	(100) 50 years	
Constitution Similarity Dimension	Non-Turmoil Countries	Legislative	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.003 (0.002)	0.004* (0.002)	0.005** (0.002)	0.004** (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)
		Elections ^{♣,+}	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)
		Executive ^{♣,++}	0.007* (0.004)	0.004 (0.004)	0.006* (0.003)	0.005** (0.003)	0.005** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)	0.009*** (0.002)	0.009*** (0.002)	0.009*** (0.002)
		Federalism	0.003 (0.003)	0.005** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.004*** (0.002)	0.003** (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)
		Rights	0.002 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.003** (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
		Judicial Independence	0.013** (0.005)	0.011** (0.004)	0.007* (0.004)	0.006 (0.004)	0.004 (0.004)	0.005 (0.003)	0.005 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	0.006** (0.003)	0.008*** (0.003)
		Constitutional Review	0.008* (0.005)	0.011*** (0.004)	0.012*** (0.004)	0.013*** (0.003)	0.014*** (0.003)	0.009*** (0.003)	0.006** (0.002)	0.004* (0.002)	0.004* (0.002)	0.004* (0.002)
	Composite for Turmoil Countries	Legislative [♣]	-0.006 (0.006)	-0.007 (0.005)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.007** (0.004)	-0.008** (0.004)	-0.011*** (0.003)	-0.009*** (0.003)	-0.008** (0.004)	-0.009** (0.003)	-0.009*** (0.003)
		Elections ^{♣,+}	-0.016*** (0.006)	-0.015*** (0.005)	-0.010*** (0.004)	-0.005 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	0.005* (0.003)
		Executive ^{♣,++}	0.014** (0.006)	0.007* (0.004)	0.006* (0.004)	0.009*** (0.003)	0.009*** (0.003)	0.009*** (0.003)	0.010*** (0.003)	0.011*** (0.003)	0.012*** (0.003)	0.010*** (0.004)
		Federalism [♣]	0.003 (0.005)	0.003 (0.004)	0.002 (0.003)	0.000 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.008*** (0.002)	-0.009*** (0.003)	-0.006* (0.004)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)
		Rights [♣]	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.003 (0.003)	0.000 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)
		Judicial Independence [♣]	0.006 (0.009)	0.003 (0.007)	0.003 (0.006)	-0.007 (0.005)	-0.009 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.006)	0.003 (0.005)	0.002 (0.006)	0.005 (0.006)	0.003 (0.005)
		Constitutional Review [♣]	0.031*** (0.008)	0.016** (0.007)	0.013** (0.006)	0.016*** (0.005)	0.014*** (0.005)	0.012** (0.005)	0.012** (0.005)	0.011** (0.005)	0.008 (0.005)	0.007 (0.005)
	Turmoil	-0.009 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)	0.003 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)	0.003 (0.003)	
	Constant	0.001 (0.014)	-0.015 (0.010)	-0.017** (0.007)	-0.024*** (0.005)	-0.021*** (0.003)	-0.018*** (0.003)	-0.019*** (0.004)	-0.020*** (0.003)	-0.019*** (0.003)	-0.014*** (0.003)	
	Observations	10,893	9,533	8,581	7,713	6,928	6,159	5,411	4,755	4,303	3,848	
	- in turmoil	1,159	1,091	945	799	681	582	508	434	389	362	
	R2	0.286	0.405	0.489	0.572	0.632	0.674	0.693	0.689	0.687	0.676	
	Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
	Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		

Notes: Regressions include dimension-interactions with turmoil and *Election-Executive* interaction (plus its interaction with turmoil); constant, turmoil, and interaction coefficients are available upon request. Newey-West standard errors (with 4 lags) in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate 1, 5, 10 percent significance levels. ♣ Composite effect calculated with the Delta method. + *Elections* effects evaluated at *Executive* mean. ++ *Executive* effects evaluated at *Elections* mean.

Table 6: Growth, Constitutional Similarity and Endogeneity

Dependent Variable: 5-year Average Economic Growth	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
		OLS			2SLS	
Constitution Similarity		0.010*** (0.004)	0.010*** (0.004)		0.015*** (0.006)	0.014*** (0.005)
Turmoil			-0.012*** (0.004)			-0.012*** (0.004)
Turmoil x Constitution Similarity			-0.000 (0.010)			0.001 (0.012)
InitialGDP	-0.015*** (0.004)	-0.015*** (0.004)	-0.015*** (0.004)	-0.020*** (0.005)	-0.019*** (0.005)	-0.019*** (0.005)
PopulationGrowth	-0.044*** (0.012)	-0.044*** (0.012)	-0.042*** (0.012)	-0.059** (0.024)	-0.054** (0.024)	-0.051** (0.024)
Government Consumption	-0.111*** (0.027)	-0.118*** (0.027)	-0.122*** (0.026)	-0.131*** (0.042)	-0.146*** (0.043)	-0.153*** (0.042)
GovernmentEffectiveness	0.010*** (0.003)	0.011*** (0.003)	0.011*** (0.003)	0.013*** (0.004)	0.015*** (0.004)	0.015*** (0.004)
LegalOrigUK	0.007** (0.003)	0.008** (0.003)	0.007** (0.003)	0.009* (0.005)	0.008* (0.005)	0.008 (0.005)
Hindu%	-0.025* (0.014)	-0.029** (0.014)	-0.026** (0.013)	-0.028 (0.018)	-0.039** (0.019)	-0.036** (0.017)
Jewish%	0.034*** (0.010)	0.043*** (0.010)	0.043*** (0.010)	0.061*** (0.017)	0.076*** (0.019)	0.071*** (0.018)
Investment	0.011*** (0.003)	0.010*** (0.003)	0.011*** (0.003)	0.006 (0.004)	0.005 (0.004)	0.006 (0.004)
Inflation	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
ExcecutiveConstraints	-0.007* (0.004)	-0.007** (0.004)	-0.007** (0.004)	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.005)
Eastern Religions%	0.012* (0.007)	0.016** (0.007)	0.018*** (0.007)	0.001 (0.009)	0.011 (0.010)	0.015 (0.010)
Land100kmFromCoast%	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.009** (0.004)	-0.008* (0.004)	-0.007 (0.004)
Protestant%	-0.008** (0.004)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.008** (0.004)	-0.010 (0.006)	-0.008 (0.006)	-0.009 (0.006)
Muslim%	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.005)	0.000 (0.005)	-0.006 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.007)	-0.004 (0.007)
Orthodox	0.006 (0.006)	0.004 (0.006)	0.004 (0.006)	0.008 (0.007)	0.005 (0.007)	0.004 (0.007)
OtherReligion%	-0.012 (0.008)	-0.009 (0.008)	-0.009 (0.008)	-0.017 (0.016)	-0.003 (0.016)	-0.006 (0.016)
Education	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
Openness	0.002 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	0.004 (0.004)	0.004 (0.005)	0.006 (0.005)	0.006 (0.005)
Fertility	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)
LifeExpectancy (Inverse)	0.007 (0.014)	0.006 (0.014)	0.002 (0.014)	0.001 (0.015)	0.002 (0.015)	-0.001 (0.015)
(Sub)Tropical%	0.005 (0.005)	0.004 (0.005)	0.005 (0.005)	0.003 (0.006)	0.004 (0.006)	0.004 (0.005)
LinguisticFractualization	-0.001 (0.006)	-0.003 (0.006)	-0.003 (0.006)	-0.007 (0.007)	-0.009 (0.007)	-0.008 (0.007)
EthnicFractualization	-0.009 (0.006)	-0.004 (0.007)	-0.004 (0.007)	-0.005 (0.007)	0.002 (0.008)	0.001 (0.008)
ExpropriationRisk	-0.007 (0.011)	-0.006 (0.011)	-0.010 (0.010)	-0.004 (0.011)	-0.004 (0.011)	-0.008 (0.011)
LegalOrigFrench	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.005)
ExportDiversity	-0.003 (0.010)	-0.001 (0.009)	-0.001 (0.009)	-0.004 (0.013)	0.000 (0.013)	-0.002 (0.013)
ExportDiversity*LowIncome	0.065*** (0.019)	0.071*** (0.019)	0.080*** (0.017)	0.065** (0.031)	0.086*** (0.031)	0.096*** (0.029)
ExportDiversity*LowMedIncome	0.027** (0.012)	0.019 (0.012)	0.023* (0.012)	0.007 (0.019)	-0.003 (0.020)	0.003 (0.020)
ExportDiversity*UpperMedIncome	0.038* (0.023)	0.032 (0.023)	0.032 (0.023)	0.059* (0.031)	0.040 (0.032)	0.046 (0.032)
Observations	579	579	579	579	579	579
R2	0.434	0.440	0.460	0.404	0.407	0.429
Regional FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1

Appendix

Table A.1: Countries and Constitution Data Coverage

Country	Constitution Data	Country	Constitution Data	Country	Constitution Data
Afghanistan	1923-2008	Georgia	1995-2008	Nicaragua	1854-2008
Albania	1914-2008	Germany	1871-2008	Niger	1960-2008
Algeria	1963-2008	Ghana	1957-2008	Nigeria	1960-2008
Andorra	1993-2008	Greece	1827-2008	Norway	1814-2008
Angola	1975-2008	Grenada	1974-2008	Oman	1996-2008
Argentina	1819-2008	Guatemala	1845-2008	Pakistan	1956-2008
Armenia	1995-2008	Guinea	1958-2008	Palau	1981-2008
Australia	1901-2008	Guinea-Bissau	1973-2008	Panama	1904-2008
Austria	1920-2008	Guyana	1966-2008	Papua New Guinea	1975-2008
Austria-Hungary	1849-1918	Haiti	1801-2008	Paraguay	1813-2008
Azerbaijan	1991-2008	Honduras	1848-2008	Peru	1826-2008
Bahrain	1973-2008	Hungary	1920-2008	Philippines	1899-2008
Bangladesh	1972-2008	Iceland	1944-2008	Poland	1921-1938, 1946-2008
Barbados	1966-2008	India	1949-2008	Portugal	1822-2008
Belarus	1994-2008	Indonesia	1945-2008	Qatar	2003-2008
Belgium	1831-2008	Iran	1906-2008	Romania	1923-2008
Belize	1981-2008	Iraq	1925-2008	Russia (Soviet Union)	1905-2008
Benin	1960-2008	Ireland	1922-2008	Rwanda	1962-2008
Bhutan	1953-2008	Israel	1958-2008	Samoa	1962-2008
Bolivia	1826-2008	Italy	1848-2008	Sao Tome And Principe	1975-2008
Bosnia-Herzegov.	1995-2008	Jamaica	1962-2008	Saudi Arabia	1992-2008
Botswana	1966-2008	Japan	1889-2008	Senegal	1959-2008
Brazil	1824-2008	Jordan	1946-2008	Seychelles	1979-2008
Bulgaria	1893-2008	Kazakhstan	1993-2008	Sierra Leone	1961-2008
Burkina Faso	1960-2008	Kenya	1963-2008	Singapore	1959-2008
Burundi	1962-2008	Kiribati	1979-2008	Slovakia	1992-2008
Cambodia	1953-2008	Korea, People's Rep.	1948-2008	Slovenia	1991-2008
Cameroon	1960-2008	Korea, Republic Of	1948-2008	Solomon Islands	1978-2008
Canada	1867-2008	Kuwait	1962-2008	Somalia	1960-2008
Cape Verde	1980-2008	Kyrgyz Republic	1993-2008	South Africa	1961-2008
Cent. African Rep.	1959-2008	Laos	1947-2008	Spain	1808-2008
Chad	1960-2008	Latvia	1922-1940, 1990-2008	Sri Lanka	1931-2008
Chile	1822-2008	Lebanon	1926-2008	St. Lucia	1978-2008
China	1912-2008	Lesotho	1966-2008	Sudan	1973-2008
Colombia	1830-2008	Liberia	1825-2008	Swaziland	1968-2008
Comoros	1975-2008	Libya	1951-2008	Sweden	1809-2008
Congo	1961-2008	Liechtenstein	1818-2008	Switzerland	1848-2008
Congo, Dem. Rep.	1964-2008	Lithuania	1922-1940, 1990-2008	Syria	1930-2008
Costa Rica	1841-2008	Luxembourg	1868-2008	Taiwan	1947-2008
Cote d'Ivoire	1960-2008	Macedonia	1991-2008	Tajikistan	1994-2008
Croatia	1991-2008	Madagascar	1959-2008	Tanzania	1961-2008
Cuba	1901-2008	Malawi	1964-2008	Thailand	1932-2008
Cyprus	1960-2008	Malaysia	1957-2008	Togo	1961-2008
Czech Republic	1993-2008	Maldives	1968-2008	Tonga	1875-2008
Czechoslovakia	1920-1938, 1946-1992	Mali	1960-2008	Trinidad and Tobago	1962-2008
Denmark	1849-2008	Malta	1964-2008	Tunisia	1959-2008
Djibouti	1977-2008	Marshall Islands	1979-2008	Turkey (Otto. Empire)	1876-2008
Dominica	1978-2008	Mauritania	1961-2008	Turkmenistan	1992-2008
Dominican Rep.	1844-2008	Mauritius	1968-2008	Tuvalu	1978-2008
Ecuador	1830-2008	Mexico	1822-2008	Uganda	1962-2008
Egypt	1923-2008	Micronesia, Fed. Sts.	1981-2008	Ukraine	1978-2008
El Salvador	1841-2008	Moldova	1994-2008	United Arab Emirates	1971-2008
Equatorial Guinea	1968-2008	Monaco	1911-2008	United Kingdom	1800-2008
Eritrea	1997-2008	Mongolia	1924-2008	USA	1800-2008
Estonia	1919-1940, 1991-2008	Morocco	1962-2008	Uruguay	1830-2008
Ethiopia	1931-2008	Mozambique	1975-2008	Uzbekistan	1992-2008
Fiji	1970-2008	Myanmar (Burma)	1947-2008	Vanuatu	1980-2008
Finland	1919-2008	Namibia	1990-2008	Venezuela	1830-2008
France	1800-2008	Nepal	1948-2008	Vietnam	1976-2008
Gabon	1960-2008	Netherlands	1848-2008	Zambia	1964-2008
Gambia	1970-2008	New Zealand	1852-2008	Zimbabwe	1965-2008

Table A.2: Constitution Variables, Definitions, and Summary Statistics

Variable	Definition	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Legislative Rules					
AMNDAMAJ	Do const.al amendments require more than a simple legislature majority for approval?	0.558	0.497	0	1
AMNDAPCT_345	What proportion of the vote is needed to approve a const. amendment? 345: 3/5 or 3/4 majority	0.053	0.224	0	1
ASSETS	Does the Const. require that legislators disclose their earnings and/or assets?	0.031	0.172	0	1
CABRESTL	Do members of the cabinet/ministers have to serve in the Legislature?	0.143	0.350	0	1
CHALSTAG	Can bills be reviewed for constitutionality by the legislature at the pre-promulgation stage?	0.178	0.383	0	1
HOUSENUM	How many chambers or houses does the Legislature contain?	0.447	0.497	0	1
IMMUNITY_2	Does the const. provide for ltd immunity for the members of the Legislature under some conditions?	0.790	0.408	0	1
INITIAT	Does the const. provide for ability of individuals to propose legislative initiatives/referenda?	0.104	0.305	0	1
INTLAW	Does the const. contain provisions concerning the relationship between the const. and int'l law?	0.644	0.479	0	1
INTORGS	Does the const. contain provisions concerning international organizations?	0.331	0.471	0	1
LEGAPP_1	Head of State has the power to approve/reject legislation once it has been passed by the legislature (not including reviews for constitutionality)?	0.781	0.414	0	1
LEGAPPDF_4	Which of the following describes the default mode for the approval of legislation? 4: Executive is required to take action: either sign/promulgate or return to the legislature	0.272	0.445	0	1
LEGAPPPT_123	Does the approving/vetoing actor have the power to approve/reject parts of the bill, the bill in its entirety, or both? 1: Can only veto parts of the bill (line-item veto), 2: Can only veto the bill in its entirety, 3: Can veto either specific parts or the bill in its entirety	0.259	0.438	0	1
LEGISL	Does the const. provide for a central representative body (a legislature)?	0.993	0.086	0	1
LEGSUPR	Is a supermajority needed for passing any legislation?	0.184	0.387	0	1
LHLEGIS	Is the first (or only) chamber of the Legislature given the power to legislate?	0.955	0.208	0	1
OVERPCT_12	A majority of the vote is needed to override a veto	0.078	0.267	0	1
OVERPCT_235	More than 2/3 of the vote is needed to override a veto	0.333	0.471	0	1
OVERRIDE	Can vetoes of legislation be overridden?	0.520	0.500	0	1
PUBMEET	Does the const. prescribe whether meetings of the Legislature are (generally) held in public?	0.485	0.500	0	1
PUBMIN	Is a record of the deliberations of the Legislature published?	0.176	0.381	0	1
REMLEG	Are there provisions for removing individual legislators?	0.555	0.497	0	1
REMPRO_2	Is the executive involved in the process for removing individual legislators?	0.043	0.203	0	1
SPECLEG_1	Does the const. provide for any of the following special legislative processes? 1: organic law	0.117	0.322	0	1
SPECLEG_2	Does the const. provide for any of the following special legislative processes? 2: budget bills	0.719	0.450	0	1
SPECLEG_3	Does the const. provide for any of the following special legislative processes? 3: tax bills	0.441	0.497	0	1
SPECLEG_4	Does the const. provide for any of the following special legislative processes? 4: finance bills	0.228	0.420	0	1
SPECLEG_5	Does the const. provide for any of the following special legislative processes? 5: spending bills	0.217	0.412	0	1
UNAMEND	Are any parts of the const. unamendable?	0.269	0.444	0	1
Elections					
ELECTFIN	Are there any provisions for limits on money used for campaigns?	0.022	0.147	0	1
LHELSSYS_12	Does the const. specify the electoral system for the first (or only) chamber? 1: Yes, one method, 2: Yes, two methods (a mixed system)	0.251	0.433	0	1
LHSELECT_3	How are members of the first (or only) chamber of the Legislature selected? 3: elected by citizens	0.824	0.380	0	1
OVERSGHT_123	Does the const. provide for an electoral commission or electoral court to oversee the election process? 1: electoral commission, 2: electoral court, 3: both	0.251	0.434	0	1
PARTPRH_23	Does the const. prohibit one or more political parties? Yes, certain types parties	0.136	0.342	0	1
PARTRGHT	Does the const. provide for a right to form political parties?	0.224	0.417	0	1
REFEREN	Does the const. provide for the ability to propose a referendum (or plebiscite)?	0.347	0.476	0	1

Variable	Definition	Mean	SD	Min	Max
UHAGE_UNDER22	Is the mini age limit for eligibility to serve in Second Chamber of the Legislature 22 or under?	0.093	0.290	0	1
UHELAYS_123	Does the const. specify the electoral system for the Second Chamber? 1: Yes, one method, 2: Yes, two methods (a mixed system), 3: Yes, but without providing any specific details	0.159	0.365	0	1
UHQUOTA	Does the const. stipulate a quota for representation of certain groups in the Second Chamber?	0.050	0.217	0	1
UHSELECT_1	How are members of the Second Chamber selected? 1: appointed	0.164	0.370	0	1
UHSELECT_2	How are members of the Second Chamber selected? 2: elected by electors	0.181	0.385	0	1
UHSELECT_3	How are members of the Second Chamber selected? 3: elected by citizens	0.193	0.395	0	1
UHTERM_3_5	Is the max term for members of the Second Chamber of the Legislature between 3 and 5 years?	0.171	0.377	0	1
VOTELIM_1	Besides age limits, which additional restrictions does the const. place on voting? 1: must not be incapacitated (mentally or physically)	0.211	0.408	0	1
VOTERES	Does the const. place any restrictions on the right to vote?	0.800	0.400	0	1
VOTEUN	Does the const. make a claim to universal adult suffrage?	0.406	0.491	0	1
Executive Constraints					
AGAP_123	Is Head of state, Head of Gov't and Gov't/Cabinet involved in approval of the attorney general?	0.091	0.287	0	1
AGNOM_123	Is Head of state, Head of Gov't and Gov't/Cabinet involved in the nom. of the attorney general?	0.279	0.449	0	1
AGTERM_OVER5	Is the maximum term length for the attorney general over 5 years?	0.044	0.205	0	1
AMNDAPPR_123	Head of state, Head of Gov't and Gov't/Cabinet approves amendments to the const.?	0.229	0.420	0	1
AMNDPROP_123	Head of state, Head of Gov't and Gov't/Cabinet propose amendments to the const.?	0.335	0.472	0	1
ATGEN	Does the const. provide for an attorney general or public prosecutor responsible for representing the government in criminal or civil cases?	0.472	0.499	0	1
BANK	Does the const. contain provisions for a central bank?	0.175	0.380	0	1
BANKGOAL_1	What are the policy goals of the central bank? 1: Price stability alone	0.013	0.112	0	1
CABAPPR_12	Who approves the cabinet/ministers? 1: Head of State, 2: Head of Government	0.222	0.416	0	1
CABAPPT_12	Who nominates/appoints the cabinet/ministers? 1: Head of State, 2: Head of Government	0.842	0.365	0	1
CABCOLL	Is cabinet/ministers collectively responsible for their actions, or can they be dismissed individually?	0.597	0.491	0	1
COMCHIEF_1	Who is the commander in chief of the armed forces? 1: head of state	0.729	0.444	0	1
DEPAPP_123	Head of state, Head of Gov't and Gov't/Cabinet approve nomination of the deputy executive?	0.049	0.217	0	1
DEPEXEC	Does const. specify a deputy executive of any kind (e.g., deputy prime minister, vice president)?	0.458	0.498	0	1
DEPNOM_123	Head of state, Head of Gov't and Gov't/Cabinet involved in the nom. of deputy executive?	0.177	0.381	0	1
EMAPPR_1	Who approves a state of emergency? 1: does not need approval	0.117	0.321	0	1
EMCOND_1	Can a state of emergency be called for war/aggression	0.435	0.496	0	1
EMCOND_2	Can a state of emergency be called for internal security	0.370	0.483	0	1
EMCOND_3	Can a state of emergency be called for national disaster	0.122	0.327	0	1
EMCOND_4	Can a state of emergency be called for general danger	0.204	0.403	0	1
EMCOND_5	Can a state of emergency be called for economic emergency	0.044	0.206	0	1
EMDECL_13	Can either Head of state, Head of Gov't, Head of Gov't declare state of emergency?	0.466	0.499	0	1
EMDECL_457	Who can declare a state of emergency? 4: government/cabinet, 5: first (or only) chamber of the legislature, 7: both chambers of the legislature are required	0.120	0.325	0	1
EMRIGHTS	Does the const. provide for suspension or restriction of rights during states of emergency?	0.418	0.493	0	1
EXECINDP	Does the const. contain explicit declaration regarding independent of central executive organ(s)?	0.098	0.297	0	1
EXECNUM_2	One executive is specified in the constitution	0.531	0.499	0	1
HOGADISS_1	Who can approve a dismissal of the Head of Government? 1: Head of State	0.110	0.313	0	1
HOGDEC	Does the Head of Government have decree power?	0.115	0.319	0	1
HOGIMM_2	Is the Head of Government provided with immunity from prosecution? 2: Yes, limited immunity	0.060	0.237	0	1
HOGPDISS_12	Can Head of state call propose dismissal of the Head of Government?	0.202	0.401	0	1

Variable	Definition	Mean	SD	Min	Max
HOGSUCC_12	Should the head of government need to be replaced before the normally scheduled replacement process, what is the process of replacement? 1: The normal selection process (whether it be election or appointment) is implemented, 2: The legislature appoints a successor	0.164	0.371	0	1
HOSADISS_19	Can Head of gov't/cabinet approve a dismissal of the Head of State?	0.004	0.060	0	1
HOSDCOND_1	Under what grounds can the Head of State be dismissed? 1: general dissatisfaction with the leadership (i.e., dismissal is fairly unrestricted)	0.065	0.246	0	1
HOSDCOND_2	Under what grounds can the head of state be dismissed? 2: crimes and other issues of conduct	0.327	0.469	0	1
HOSDCOND_3	Under what grounds can the head of state be dismissed? 3: treason	0.204	0.403	0	1
HOSDCOND_4	Under what grounds can the head of state be dismissed? 4: violations of the const.	0.195	0.396	0	1
HOSDCOND_5	Under what grounds can the head of state be dismissed? 5: incapacitated	0.141	0.348	0	1
HOSDEC	Does the Head of State have decree power?	0.585	0.493	0	1
HOSDISS	Are there provisions for dismissing the Head of State?	0.584	0.493	0	1
HOSELECT_1	How is the Head of State selected? 1: heredity/royal selection	0.269	0.443	0	1
HOSELECT_2	How is the Head of State selected? 2: elected by citizens	0.344	0.475	0	1
HOSELECT_3	How is the Head of State selected? 3: elected by elite group	0.304	0.460	0	1
HOSELSYS_1	Which of these best categorizes the electoral system for the Head of State? 1: plurality	0.047	0.212	0	1
HOSELSYS_4567	Which of these best categorizes the electoral system for the Head of State? 4: Majority, unspecified, 5: Majority, alternative vote method, 6: Majority, by two round method with popular run-off, 7: Majority, by two round method with assembly run-off	0.211	0.408	0	1
HOSPDISS_19	Can the head of government/cabinet propose a dismissal of the Head of State?	0.038	0.192	0	1
HOSSUCC_1	Should the head of state need to be replaced before the normally scheduled replacement process, what is the process of replacement? 1: normal selection process (whether it be election or appointment) is implemented	0.333	0.471	0	1
HOSSUCC_2	Should the head of state need to be replaced before the normally scheduled replacement process, what is the process of replacement? 2: the legislature appoints a successor	0.050	0.218	0	1
HOSSUCC_4	Should the head of state need to be replaced before the normally scheduled replacement process, what is the process of replacement? 4: A predetermined line of succession is followed	0.376	0.484	0	1
HOSTERM_UNDER5	Is the maximum term length of the Head of State 5 years or under?	0.429	0.495	0	1
LEGDISS_1	Who, if anybody, can dismiss the legislature? 1: head of state	0.511	0.500	0	1
LEGINVEXE_NO	Does the legislature not have the power to investigate the activities of the executive branch?	0.056	0.230	0	1
TERR	Does the const. define the geographic borders/territory of the state?	0.157	0.364	0	1
WAR_13	Who has the power to declare war? 1: head of state, 3: the government/cabinet	0.492	0.500	0	1
WAR_47	Who has the power to declare war? 4: First (or only) Chamber of the Legislature, 7: Both Chambers, acting jointly	0.215	0.411	0	1
WARAP_123	Who has the power to approve declarations of war? 1: Head of State, 2: Head of Government, 3: Government/Cabinet	0.036	0.186	0	1
Judiciary Rules					
ADAP_123	Who is involved in the approval of judges to administrative courts? 1: Head of State, 2: Head of Government, 3: Government/Cabinet	0.021	0.145	0	1
ADNOM_123	Who is involved in the nomination of judges to administrative courts? 1: Head of State, 2: Head of Government, 3: Government/Cabinet	0.059	0.236	0	1
ADTERM_OVER5	Is the maximum term length for judges for administrative courts over 5 years?	0.037	0.190	0	1
CAPPUN	Does the const. universally prohibit the use of capital punishment?	0.134	0.341	0	1
CHFTERM_OVER5	Is the maximum term length for the Chief Justice of the Highest Ordinary Court over 5 years?	0.050	0.217	0	1
CHIEFAP_123	Who is involved in the approval of nominations for the Chief Justice of the Highest Ordinary Court? 1: Head of State, 2: Head of Government, 3: Government/Cabinet	0.048	0.213	0	1
CHIEFNOM_123	Who is involved in the nomination of the Chief Justice of the Highest Ordinary Court? 1: Head of State, 2: Head of Government, 3: Government/Cabinet	0.115	0.319	0	1
CONAP_123	Who is involved in the approval of judges to the constitutional court? 1: Head of State, 2: Head of Government, 3: Government/Cabinet	0.033	0.179	0	1
CONNOM_123	Who is involved in the nomination of judges to the constitutional court? 1: Head of State, 2: Head of Government, 3: Government/Cabinet	0.113	0.317	0	1
CONPOW_123456	Does the constitutional court have any additional powers besides reviewing legislation?	0.120	0.326	0	1

Variable	Definition	Mean	SD	Min	Max
CORPPUN	Does the const. universally prohibit the use of corporal punishment?	0.090	0.286	0	1
COUNS	Does the const. provide the right to counsel if one is indicted or arrested?	0.377	0.485	0	1
DEBTORS	Does the const. forbid the detention of debtors?	0.131	0.338	0	1
DUEPROC	Does the const. explicitly mention due process?	0.111	0.314	0	1
ECAP_123	Who is involved in the approval of judges nominated to the electoral court? 1: Head of State, 2: Head of Government, 3: Government/Cabinet	0.010	0.099	0	1
ECNOM_123	Who is involved in the nomination of judges to the electoral court? 1: Head of State, 2: Head of Government, 3: Government/Cabinet	0.013	0.114	0	1
ECTERM_OVER5	Is the maximum term length for judges for the electoral court over 5 years?	0.008	0.089	0	1
EXAMWIT_3	Does the const. provide for the right to examine evidence or confront all witnesses? 3: both	0.035	0.185	0	1
EXPCOND_137	Under what conditions or for what purposes can the state expropriate private property? 1: Infrastructure, public works, 3: national defense, 7: general public purpose	0.671	0.470	0	1
EXPCOND_2456	Under what conditions or for what purposes can the state expropriate private property? 2: redistribution to other citizens, 4: land, natural resource preservation, 5: exploitation of natural resources, 6: land reform	0.061	0.239	0	1
EXPOST	Does the const. prohibit punishment by laws enacted ex post facto?	0.580	0.494	0	1
EXPRCOMP_1234	What is the specified level of compensation for expropriation of private property? 1: fair/just, 2: full, 3: appropriate, 4: adequate	0.512	0.500	0	1
EXPROP	Can the government expropriate private property under at least some conditions?	0.823	0.382	0	1
FAIRTRI	Does the constitution provide the right to a fair trial?	0.220	0.414	0	1
FALSEIMP	Does the constitution provide for the right of some redress in the case of false imprisonment, arrest, or judicial error?	0.236	0.425	0	1
HABCORP	Does the constitution provide for the right to protection from unjustified restraint (habeas corpus)?	0.661	0.473	0	1
ILLADMIN	Does the const. contain provisions protecting individuals against illegal administrative actions?	0.262	0.440	0	1
INTPROP_1234	Does the const. mention any of the following intellectual property rights? 1: patents, 2: copyrights, 3: trademark, 4: general reference to intellectual property	0.334	0.471	0	1
JC	Does the const. contain provisions for a Judicial Council/Commission?	0.289	0.453	0	1
JREM	Are there provisions for dismissing judges?	0.664	0.472	0	1
JREMAP_123	Can Head of State / Head of gov't/cabinet approve the dismissal of judges?	0.156	0.363	0	1
JREMPRO_123	Can Head of State / Head of gov't/cabinet dismissal of judges?	0.096	0.295	0	1
JUDCRTS_1	Does const. contain provisions for administrative courts?	0.193	0.395	0	1
JUDCRTS_2	Does const. contain provisions for constitutional court?	0.180	0.384	0	1
ORDAP_123	Head of State / Head of gov't/cabinet involved in approval of nominations to ordinary courts?	0.219	0.414	0	1
ORDNOM_123	Head of State / Head of gov't/cabinet involved in nomination of judges to ordinary courts?	0.247	0.431	0	1
ORDTERM_OVER5	Is the maximum term length for judges for ordinary courts over 5 years?	0.149	0.356	0	1
PREREL	Does the const. provide for the right/possibility of pre-trial release?	0.257	0.437	0	1
PRESINOC	Is there a presumption of innocence in trials?	0.310	0.462	0	1
PROPRGHT	Does the const. provide for a right to own property?	0.668	0.471	0	1
PUBTRI	Does the const. generally require public trials?	0.469	0.499	0	1
RGHTAPP	Do defendants have the right to appeal judicial decisions?	0.184	0.387	0	1
RULELAW	Does the const. contain a gen. statement regarding rule of law/legality/Rechtsstaat?	0.165	0.371	0	1
SPEEDTRI	Does the const. provide for the right to a speedy trial?	0.240	0.427	0	1
SUPAP_123	Head of State / Head of gov't/cabinet involved in approval of nom. to highest ordinary court?	0.193	0.395	0	1
SUPNOM_123	Head of State / Head of gov't/cabinet involved in nom. of judges to highest ordinary court?	0.320	0.466	0	1
SUPTERM_OVER5	The maximum term length for judges for the highest ordinary court is over 5 years.	0.284	0.451	0	1
TRILANG	Does the const. specify the trial has to be in a language the accused understands or the right to an interpreter if the accused cannot understand the language?	0.151	0.358	0	1
WOLAW	Does the const. mention nulla poena sine lege or the principle that no person should be punished without law?	0.651	0.477	0	1
Federalism					
FEDERAL_1	Does the const. recognize Local/Municipal Governments?	0.638	0.480	0	1
FEDERAL_2	Does the const. recognize Subsidiary Units (regions, states, or provinces)?	0.660	0.474	0	1

Variable	Definition	Mean	SD	Min	Max
FEDERAL_3	Does the const. recognize Autonomous Indigenous Groups?	0.053	0.224	0	1
FEDREV	Does the const. contain provisions allowing review of the legislation of the constituent units in federations by federal judicial or other central government organs?	0.189	0.391	0	1
FEDUNIT_3	Is the state described as either federal, confederal, or unitary? 1: federal, 2:confederal	0.187	0.390	0	1
FEDUNIT_12	Is the state described as either federal, confederal, or unitary? 3: unitary	0.120	0.325	0	1
Individual and Human Rights					
ACFREE	Does the const. guarantee academic freedom?	0.271	0.445	0	1
ACHIGHED_1	Does the const. guarantee equal access to higher education? 1: Yes	0.057	0.232	0	1
ACHIGHED_2	Does the const. guarantee equal access to higher education? 2: Yes, but qualified	0.061	0.239	0	1
ASSEM	Does the const. provide for freedom of assembly	0.726	0.446	0	1
ASSOCEXPROP	Combination of ASSOC ('Does the const. provide for freedom of association?'), EXPRESS ('Does the const. provide for freedom of expression or speech?'), and OPINION ('Does the const. provide for freedom of opinion, thought, and/or conscience?')	0.861	0.346	0	1
BINDING	Are rights provisions binding on private parties as well as the state?	0.081	0.273	0	1
BUSINES	Does the const. provide a right to conduct/establish a business?	0.241	0.428	0	1
CC	Does the const. contain provisions for a counter corruption commission?	0.021	0.142	0	1
CENSOR_12	Does the const. prohibit censorship? 1: Yes, 2: Censorship allowed in exceptional cases (i.e. war, state of emergency, or in the interest of public safety, etc.)	0.379	0.485	0	1
CULTRGHT	Does the const. refer to a state duty to protect or promote culture or cultural rights?	0.310	0.462	0	1
ECONPLAN	Does the const. mention the adoption of national economic plans?	0.138	0.345	0	1
EDCOMPFREE	Does the const. stipulate that education be compulsory until at least some level? Or does the const. stipulate that education be free, at least up to some level?	0.514	0.500	0	1
EQUAL	Does the const. refer to equality before the law, the equal rights of men, or non-discrimination?	0.824	0.380	0	1
EQUALGR	Does the const. protect any particular group from discrimination/provide equality for?	0.630	0.483	0	1
ETHINCL	Does the const. contain provisions concerning national integration of ethnic communities?	0.106	0.307	0	1
FINSUP	Does the const. provide for either general or financial support by the government for any of the following groups: elderly, unemployed, disabled or children/orphans?	0.398	0.490	0	1
FREECOMP	Does the const. provide the right to a free and/or competitive market?	0.095	0.293	0	1
FREEMOVE	Does the const. provide for freedom of movement?	0.564	0.496	0	1
FREEREL	Does the const. provide for freedom of religion?	0.772	0.420	0	1
GOVMED_2	Can state operated print/electronic media outlets	0.043	0.203	0	1
HEALTHF	Does the const. specify that healthcare should be provided by government free of charge?	0.087	0.281	0	1
HEALTHR	Does the const. mention the right to health care?	0.202	0.402	0	1
HR	Does the const. contain provisions for a human rights commission?	0.020	0.141	0	1
INFOACC	Does the const. provide for individual right to view gov't files/documents under some conditions?	0.094	0.292	0	1
JOINTRDE	Does the const. provide for the right to form or to join trade unions?	0.390	0.488	0	1
LIBEL	Does the const. provide for the right of protection of one's reputation from libelous actions?	0.161	0.367	0	1
MEDCOM	Does the const. mention a special regulatory body/institution to oversee the media market?	0.050	0.219	0	1
MEDMARK_12345	Does the const. mention any of the following general principles about the operation of the media market? 1: no monopoly or oligopoly, 2: competitive, 3: pluralism, 4: balanced, 5: fair	0.041	0.199	0	1
OFFREL_1	Does the const. contain provisions concerning a national or official religion or a national or official church? 1: Yes, national religion specified	0.307	0.461	0	1
OPGROUP	Does the const. provide for positive obligations to transfer wealth to, or provide opportunity for, particular groups?	0.091	0.288	0	1
PROVHLTH	Does the const. mention a state duty to provide health care?	0.216	0.412	0	1
PRTYDUTY	Does the const. refer to a duty to join a political party?	0.002	0.042	0	1
RELTAX	Are religious organizations granted tax free status?	0.045	0.208	0	1
REMUNER	Does the const. provide the right to just remuneration, fair or equal payment for work?	0.246	0.431	0	1
SCIFREE	Does the const. provide for a right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress?	0.037	0.188	0	1
SELFDDET	Does the const. provide for a people's right of self-determination?	0.060	0.238	0	1
SEPREL	Does the const. contain an explicit decree of separation of church and state?	0.194	0.395	0	1

Variable	Definition	Mean	SD	Min	Max
SHELTER	Does the const. provide for the right to shelter or housing?	0.102	0.303	0	1
STANDLIV	Does the const. provide for a right to an adequate or reasonable standard of living?	0.113	0.316	0	1
STRIKE 12	Does the const. provide for a right to strike? 1: Yes, 2: Yes, but with limitations	0.208	0.406	0	1
TAXES	Does the const. refer to a duty to pay taxes?	0.307	0.461	0	1
TORTURE 12	Does the const. prohibit torture universally or in case of war?	0.424	0.494	0	1
TRADEUN	Does the const. refer to a duty to join trade unions?	0.001	0.032	0	1
WORK	Does the const. refer to a duty to work?	0.199	0.399	0	1

Table A.3: Judicial Independence and Constitutional Review Indices

1) Judicial Independence

La Porta et al. (2004, Table 1) compute the Judicial Independence index as the normalized sum of (1) the tenure of supreme court judges, (2) the tenure of administrative court judges, and (3) a case law variable. Using data from the Comparative Constitutions Project (2015), we compute the index according to the following criteria:

Constitutional Provision	Points
The constitution contains an explicit declaration regarding the independence of the central judicial organs(s).	+1
Judicial decisions by the highest ordinary court are final.	+2
The constitution explicitly states that judicial salaries are protected from governmental intervention.	+1
The maximum term length for judges for the highest ordinary court is longer than six 6 years but not lifelong.	+1
The maximum term length for judges for the highest ordinary court is lifelong.	+2
The maximum term length for judges for administrative courts is longer than six 6 years but not lifelong.	+1
The maximum term length for judges for administrative courts is lifelong.	+2

2) Constitutional Review

La Porta et al. (2004, Table 1) compute the Constitutional Review index as the normalized sum of (1) a judiciary review index and (2) a rigidity of constitution index. The judiciary review index measures the extent to which judges (either supreme court or constitutional court) have the power to review the constitutionality of laws. The rigidity of constitution index measures how hard it is to change the constitution in a given country. Using data from the Comparative Constitutions Project (2015), we compute the index according to the following criteria:

Constitutional Provision	Points
The constitution assigns the responsibility for the interpretation of the constitution to any ordinary court.	+1
The constitution assigns the responsibility for the interpretation of the constitution to a constitutional court.	+1
The constitution assigns the responsibility for the interpretation of the constitution to a supreme court only.	+1
The constitution assigns the responsibility for the interpretation of the constitution to a special chamber of the supreme court.	+1
Amendments to the constitution are approved by the head of state.	+1
Amendments to the constitution are approved by the head of government.	+1
Amendments to the constitution are approved by the government/cabinet.	+1
Amendments to the constitution are approved by the first (or only) chamber of the legislature.	+1
Amendments to the constitution are approved by the second chamber of the legislature.	+1
Amendments to the constitution are approved by both chambers of the legislature.	+2
Amendments to the constitution are approved by the public.	+1
To approve a constitutional amendment, an absolute majority of the vote in the legislature is required.	+1
To approve a constitutional amendment, a 3/5 majority of the vote in the legislature is required.	+1
To approve a constitutional amendment, a 2/3 majority of the vote in the legislature is required.	+2
To approve a constitutional amendment, a 3/4 majority of the vote in the legislature is required.	+2
To approve a constitutional amendment, an unspecified supermajority of the vote in the legislature is required.	+2

Description of the Constitution Data

The original ‘Characteristics of National Constitutions’ dataset (version 2.0) was downloaded from <http://www.comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/> on July 31, 2015. It included annual panel data on constitutional provisions in 214 countries. To conduct the empirical analysis, a number of variables needed to be recoded or dropped. Below we provide the details of the necessary changes to generate our dataset (also programmed in the provided CONSTITUTION_DATA.do Stata file). The coding pdf file can be obtained from the constitutions project website. The dataset was altered for six major reasons.

I) Irrelevant Variables

A number of variables are irrelevant to our analysis, for example COWCODE (Correlates of War country code) or SOURCE (‘What is the source for the text of the Constitution?’). All excluded variables due to irrelevance are given in the CONSTITUTION_DATA.do file.

II) Variables Required Recoding

Some variables were originally coded categorically. Enumerated type were recoded into dichotomous (binary) variables. Details on the coding are provided in the CONSTITUTION_DATA.do file. When none of the individual answers had meaningful interpretations, they were dropped. All variables dropped because the lack of meaningful interpretations are given in the CONSTITUTION_DATA.do file.

III) Imprecise Variable Definitions

Some variables were imprecisely defined, for example when the definitions included the terms “refer” or “mention” without further definition. For example, the variable MARKET (‘Does the constitution refer to the ‘free market,’ ‘capitalism,’ or an analogous term?’) is ambiguous whether the reference is positive or negative. All excluded variables are given in the CONSTITUTION_DATA.do file.

IV) Ambiguous Variable Coding

Some variables are coded ambiguously in the sense that the definitions imply unclear alternative hypotheses.

AMEND (‘Does the constitution provide for at least one procedure for amending the constitution?’) is deleted since it contradicts in part UNAMEND (‘Are any parts of the constitution unamendable?’).

CRUELTY (‘Does the constitution prohibit cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment?’) is deleted for lack of an interpretation for a zero, since no country in our dataset explicitly allows cruel treatment in the constitution.

CUSTLAW2_123 (‘What is the status of customary international law in the constitution?’) is dropped since the answer is conditional on a positive response to CUSTLAW (‘Does the Constitution refer to ‘customary’ international law or the ‘law of nations?’), which we exclude based on its imprecise definition, see point III).

FREELEC (‘Does the constitution prescribe that electoral ballots be secret?’) is dropped since it is unclear whether a zero necessarily implies that elections are not free. Australia and the United States are prominent examples for countries that do not specify secret ballots in their constitution.

HOSIMM_12 (‘Is the Head of State provided with absolute or limited immunity from prosecution?’) is eliminated because no country in our dataset explicitly denies immunity to the head of state.

HOSTERML_5 (‘Are there no restrictions in place regarding the number of terms the Head of State may serve?’), LHTRMLIM_5 (‘Are there no restrictions in place regarding the number of terms members of the first (or only) chamber may serve?’) and UHTRMLIM_5 (‘Are there no restrictions in place regarding the number of terms members of the second chamber may serve?’) are deleted since most countries do not specify term limits in their constitution, leaving us with an unclear alternative hypothesis.

INTEEXEC_123 (‘Does the legislature have the power to interpellate members of the executive branch, or similarly, is the executive responsible for reporting its activities to the legislature on a regular basis?’) had to be dropped because the meaning of interpellate differs widely across constitutions (ranging in meaning from “has the right to submit questions” to “has the ability to schedule a vote of confidence”).

INVEXE (‘Does the legislature have the power to investigate the activities of the executive branch?’) is replaced with LEGINVEXE_NO, which only takes the value one if the constitution explicitly prohibits the legislature to investigate the activities of the executive, and zero otherwise.

JUDPREC (‘Does the constitution stipulate that courts have to take into account decisions of higher courts?’) is dropped since definition does not indicate how higher court decisions have to be “taken into account”.

JUDIND (‘Does the constitution contain an explicit declaration regarding the independence of the central judicial organ(s)?’) is dropped because the variable does not indicate what the declaration exactly refers to, e.g., which central judicial organs are included and whether their independence is ensured or ruled out.

OCCUPATE ('Does the constitution provide for the right to choose ones occupation?') is dropped from the dataset, since specific rights are frequently subsumed under more general statements in constitutions. For example, the US constitution contains no statement regarding "free occupational choice" (hence OCCUPATE=0), but the 9th amendment states "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." PRIVACY ('Does the constitution provide for a right of privacy?'), DEVLPER ('Does the constitution provide for an individual's right to self-determination or the right to free development of personality?') and SAFEWORK ('Does the constitution mention the right to safe/healthy working conditions?') are dropped for the same reason. For example, while the US constitution makes no explicit statement regarding PRIVACY (hence PRIVACY =0), there are a number of provisions that refer to the right of privacy, such as the protection of home and property (4th amendment) or the privacy of beliefs (1st amendment).

OFFREL_3 ('Does the constitution contain provisions that specifically prohibit a national religion?') is deleted because its simultaneous inclusion with OFFREL_1 ('Does the constitution contain provisions that specify a national religion?') would imply an unclear alternative hypothesis for both variables.

PRESS ('Does the constitution provide for freedom of the press?') is deleted due to some unclear codings in the data. For instance, the current French constitution does not contain an explicit statement on the freedom of the press, implying PRESS=0. However, it declares in the preamble that the country's standard for citizens' guaranteed rights is the "The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789", which in article 11 states that "The free expression of thought and opinions is one of the most precious rights of man: thus every citizen may freely speak, write, and print, subject to accountability for abuse of this freedom in the cases determined by law."

SLAVE ('Does the constitution universally prohibit slavery, servitude, or forced labor?') is dropped because no country in our dataset explicitly allows slavery in its constitution.

V) Correlation

Some constitutional rules feature high correlations and capture similar concepts. These variables are dropped to minimize multicollinearity issues:

OVERWHO_13456 ('Can the legislature override vetoes of legislation?') is dropped due to its near perfect correlation with OVERRIDE ('Can vetoes of legislation be overridden?').

UHLEGISL ('Is the Second Chamber of the Legislature given the power to legislate?') and HOUSENUM ('Does the legislature contain one chamber or house?') have a correlation coefficient of .94; we thus eliminate UHLEGISL. In addition, HOGELECT_4 ('Is the Head of Government appointed?') and HOGDISS ('Are there provisions for dismissing the Head of Government?') are highly correlated with EXECNUM_2 ('One executive is specified in the constitution. '), with correlation coefficients of -.83 and .99, respectively. We only keep EXECNUM_2.

EDCOMP ('Does the constitution stipulate that education be compulsory until at least some level?') and EDFREE ('Does the constitution stipulate that education be free, at least up to some level?') are combined into EDCOMPFREE given that they capture similar dimensions. EDCOMPFREE takes the value one if we observe a positive response for one of the variables, and zero otherwise.

ASSOC ('Does the constitution provide for freedom of association?'), EXPRESS ('Does the constitution provide for freedom of expression or speech?'), and OPINION ('Does the constitution provide for freedom of opinion, thought, and/or conscience?') are combined for the same reasons into ASSOCEXPRESSOPINION, which takes the value one if either of the three variables features a positive response.

EXPLIM ('What limits/conditions are placed on the ability of the government to expropriate private property?') has an interpretation that is nearly identical to EXPROP ('Can the government expropriate private property under at least some conditions?'). We therefore only keep the latter variable.

VI) Variables with Conditional Coding

The coding of several variables is conditioned on other constitutional rules, which complicates their interpretation. For instance, HOGDECIM ('Which arrangement describes the implementation procedure for Head of Government decrees?') is only answered when HOGDEC ('Does the Head of Government have decree power?') takes the value one. In this case, we only keep the latter variable. Other variables excluded on this basis are given in the CONSTITUTION_DATA.do Stata file.